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INTRODUCTION
Reading this law review Article presumably means that at some
point you came to love—as well as perhaps occasionally (and only
professionally, of course) despise—a number of law school professors.
The professors that you love may: (a) possess long-standing reputations
that cause wait lists to enroll in their courses; (b) receive university-wide
awards outside of the law school for excellence as educators; (c) attract
additional caché to the law school through their scholarly research,
writing, and presentations; or (d) positively and indelibly impact
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students’ academic, professional, and personal lives. For a moment,
however, imagine your academic, professional, or personal life without
ever having the opportunity to engage with those—or any other—
venerated law school professors.
While seemingly far-fetched, such a scenario currently represents a
legitimate nationwide threat, even at the least suspecting law schools.
During my first semester as a tenure-track law professor at an American
Bar Association (“A.B.A.”) fully-accredited law school, in fewer than
ten trading days, the market value2 of the parent entity that controls the
law school plummeted more than thirty-seven percent.3 In the crasser
language of dollar terms, my employer’s market value declined more
than three-quarters of a billion dollars from October 4, 2010, through
October 18, 2010. Some readers likely will believe that such financial
problems relegate themselves solely to those of us who chose to teach4
at so-called “for-profit,” “proprietary,” or “fourth-tier toilet”5 law
2. See, e.g., TIM KOLLER ET AL., VALUATION: MEASURING AND MANAGING THE
VALUE OF COMPANIES 433-34 (McKinsey & Company, Wiley & Sons 2005)
(comparing market value to intrinsic value).
3. The per-share stock price dropped from $15.73 to $9.90 between October 4,
2010 and October 18, 2010. See Education Management Corporation (EDMC)
Historical Prices, YAHOO! FINANCE, http://finance.yahoo.com/q/hp?s=EDMC+
Historical+Prices (last visited July 20, 2011). EDMC had 142,874,389 common shares
outstanding on August 31, 2010. EDMC, Annual Report 1 (Form 10-K) (Sept. 1, 2010)
[hereinafter EDMC 10-K]. Multiplying the market price per share by the number of
common shares authorized, issued, and outstanding on each date quantifies in dollar
terms the decline in EDMC’s equity market capitalization. STEPHEN J. MOYER,
DISTRESSED DEBT ANALYSIS: STRATEGIES FOR SPECULATIVE INVESTORS 48 (J. Ross
Pub., 2005) (discussing capitalization and indicating that “equity, of course, is market
derived”).
4. This Article’s author earned an Ed.M. rather than an LL.M., specifically in
hopes of joining the faculty of a school that valued teaching a combination of theory
and praxis as much as producing scholarship. He thereby voluntarily left a full-time
position as an Assistant Professor of Finance at a US News First Tier school in chilly
New England to join the tenure-track faculty of a creatively financed Fourth Tier law
school in climate-friendly Southern California. See U.S. News & World Report, Best
Colleges Issue 94 (Sept. 2009) (ranking Providence College #2, Tier 1, Regional
Universities, Northern United States).
5. Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas has noted that bloggers have called
the group of schools that US News ranks in the tier above my employer’s as “Third Tier
Trash” (emphasis added). Compare Tony Mauro, Justice Thomas, on the Road Again,
CAL. SUP. CT. MONITOR, Feb. 5, 2010 (“Thomas took some pride in the fact that
bloggers have called his clerks ‘TTT - third tier trash,’ . . . [stating his] ‘preference for
non-Ivy League law clerks.’”), with Kashmir Hill & David Lat, Clarence Thomas
Clarifies: His Clerks Aren’t ‘TTT’, ABOVE THE LAW (Feb. 6, 2010), http://abovethelaw
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schools. Other readers, whether students, faculty, or other law school
stakeholders, may likely trust—since their law schools are housed
within a flagship “state” university6 or because their law schools reside
in the hands of a small consortium of seemingly beneficent not-forprofit owners7—that their law schools are immune from facing
capitalistic financial market pressures that can go to the heart of a law
school’s faculty or decanal8 retention.
But those readers should think again. As Professor Christopher C.
Morphew and Dr. Peter D. Eckel stated, “[t]he trend toward
privatization in higher education is clearly accelerating . . . [and w]hat
seemed like science fiction only a few years ago is now” becoming a
reality.9 For instance, public-sounding law schools, such as the
.com/2010/02/clarence-thomas-clarifies-his-clerks-arent-ttt/ (“[Thomas] complained
about ‘smart bloggers’ — or ‘self-proclaimed smart bloggers’ — labeling his clerks
‘TTT’ last year.”).
6. See, e.g., Bridget, Comment to Mich. GOP Votes to Fine Colleges for SameSex Benefits (Reader Comments Section), THE ADVOCATE (May 9, 2011, 3:18:30 PM)
available at http://www.advocate.com/News/Daily_News/2011/05/09/Michigan_GOP_
Votes_to_Fine_Colleges_for_Same_sex_Benefits/. This comment demonstrated a
Michigan State University College of Law student’s erroneous belief that her law
school was publicly funded, stating,
Name: Bridget Date posted: 5/9/2011 3:18:30 PM Hometown: Lansing Comment:
@Al: the colleges are “skirting the law” because Michigan has a law that says that
public institutions can’t offer benefits to anyone but spouses and dependents. But
most of the schools (like Michigan State University, where I go to law school and
where my wife works) has something called Other Eligible Individuals (OEIs),
meaning that gay and lesbian couples as well as straight unmarried couples can still
receive benefits. Isn’t Michigan just the greatest? :-/

Id (emphasis added).
7. See, e.g., Repard, infra note 18 (discussing California Western School of Law’s
position as an acquisition target over the past several years).
8. See Closius’ Resignation Letter, infra note 23 (referencing the Resignation of
Dean Phillip Closius from University of Baltimore School of Law in meaningful part
due to financial market pressures on an ostensibly public law school) and detailed
analysis infra Parts III-IV.
9. Peter D. Eckel & Christopher C. Morphew, Toward a Clearer Understanding
of Privatization, in PRIVATIZING THE PUBLIC UNIVERSITY: PERSPECTIVES FROM ACROSS
THE ACADEMY 181 (Christopher C. Morphew & Peter D. Eckel eds., Johns Hopkins
Univ. Press. 2009) [hereinafter, PRIVATIZING THE PUBLIC UNIVERSITY]. “Privatization”
generally refers to “the penetration of private capital, ownership and influence into what
were previously publicly funded and owned entities and activities,” while
“marketization” generally refers to “the organization of the supply of higher education
‘services’ on market lines.” Roger Brown, Markets and Non-Markets, in HIGHER
EDUCATION AND THE MARKET 6, 17 (Roger Brown ed., Routledge 2011) [hereinafter,

2012]

FACULTY LEVERAGED BUYOUTS

391

Michigan State University College of Law,10 the Western State
University College of Law,11 and the University of Virginia School of
Law,12 are, in fact, privately financed entities.13 In July 2011, another
flagship state law school—the University of Minnesota—announced its
potential going-private transaction.14

HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE MARKET]. “Marketization” also describes the process of
students making consumer-driven decisions with federal financial aid and “the
application of economic theory of the market to the provision of higher education.”
Roger Brown, INTRODUCTION to HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE MARKET 1; SHEILA
SLAUGHTER & GARY RHOADES, ACADEMIC CAPITALISM AND THE NEW ECONOMY:
MARKETS, STATE, AND HIGHER EDUCATION 35 (Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 2004).
10. See KATHY REEVES BRACCO & WILLIAM R. DOYLE, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
FINANCING OF HIGHER EDUCATION: SHAPING PUBLIC POLICY FOR THE FUTURE 165
(Patrick M. Callan & Joni E. Finney eds., Oryx Press 1997).
Michigan State University has gone so far as to purchase and operate a ‘private’
institution, the Detroit College of Law. Although legislators had made it clear before
the purchase that no new public law schools were needed in the state, MSU took over
the Detroit College of Law, saying that the college would not receive state money and
would remain fully private. A member of the state board of education, skeptical that
this would be the case, hinted that money could be distributed across various line
items in many different ways. Michigan State University has since been criticized for
duplicating the services of state law schools and ignoring legislative input.
Nonetheless, MSU is now offering a ‘private’ educational service through the Detroit
College of Law.

Id. (emphasis added).
11. See, e.g., EDMC 10-K, supra note 3, at 13.
12. Patrick G. Lee, Public Schools Ditching State Money for Private Funds, WALL
ST. J. LAW BLOG (July 6, 2011, 9:34 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/07/06/publicschools-ditching-state-money-for-private-funds/. See generally Robert C. Lowry,
Incomplete Contracts and the Political Economy of Privatization, in PRIVATIZING THE
PUBLIC UNIVERSITY, supra note 9, at 52-53 (describing the Virginia charter system,
stating that the “University of Virginia law and business schools . . . do not receive any
subsidies for operating expenses,” and indicating that the University of Colorado
recently obtained similar “enterprise” status, perhaps to avoid the state’s Taxpayer Bill
of Rights, and relating these creative arrangements to Cornell University’s “distinction
between endowed and statutory colleges charging separate tuitions”) (internal citations
omitted).
13. Broadly speaking, higher education institutes (“HEIs”) that exist as public
entities “receive direct financial support in the form of appropriations from state
governments. At the other extreme, are private institutions that do not receive state
appropriations. There are also institutions that fall somewhere in between these
extremes.” Robert Toutkoushian, An Economist’s Perspective on the Privatization of
Public Higher Education, in PRIVATIZING THE PUBLIC UNIVERSITY, supra note 9, at 60.
14. See generally Jenna Ross, Two U of M schools consider switching to privatefunding only, STARTRIBUNE.COM (July 4, 2011), http://m.startribune.com/news/?id
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Although contrary to one’s initial instinctual reaction upon hearing
the “state” law school name, a trend exists to privatize and creatively
finance these entities. Creatively financed law schools (“CFLSs”)
inconspicuously scatter themselves throughout all tiers of US News’
rankings.15 A CFLS, therefore, may be a separate “silo-financed”16 entity
relative to the rest of its corresponding university, or it may be a type of
hybrid-financed17 entity. Besides creative financing, other law schools
recently caught the attention of third party suitors and became subject to
restructuring discussions that resembled traditional corporate merger
and acquisition (“M&A”) activity.18 Maintaining creative financing and
=124987709&c=y; Becca Shrake, U Law School May Need to Go it Alone: The Law
School May Be Forced to Become Financially Self-Sufficient, MNDAILY.COM (June 1,
2011), http://www.mndaily.com/2011/06/01/u-law-school-may-need-go-it-alone; Dolph
C. Simmons, Jr., State Funding Cuts Spur Universities to Ponder Privatization,
LJWORLD.COM (July 9, 2011), http://www2.ljworld.com/news/2011/jul/09/statefunding-cuts-spur-universitiesponder-privat/; Karen Sloan, Another Public Law School
Considers Dispensing With State Money, THE NAT’L L.J. (July 5, 2011),
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202499376380&Another_public
_law_school_considers_dispensing_with_state_money&slreturn=1&hbxlogin=1 ( “The
University of Virginia School of Law, the University of Michigan Law School and the
University of California, Berkeley School of Law each receive little to no public
money, and former Arizona State University Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law
Dean Paul Schiff Berman last year proposed eliminating public funding gradually over
five years”).
15. See U.S. News Best Law Schools: Ranked in 2011, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REPORT, available at http://grad-schools.usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/best-grad
uate-schools/top-law-schools/law-rankings (last visited July 20, 2011) (ranking, inter
alia, the University of Virginia, #9; Michigan State University, #95, Western State
University College of Law; listed but ranking unpublished).
16. I employ this term to describe a law school that either receives its revenues and
capitalization from sources other than the broader university or exists as a separate legal
entity from the rest of its university. When referring to HEIs’ organizational
architectures, I prefer “silos” to, inter alia, Eckel and Morphew’s “garbage cans.” See,
e.g., Peter D. Eckel and Christopher C. Morphew, The Organizational Dynamics of
Privatization in Public Research Universities, in PRIVATIZING THE PUBLIC UNIVERSITY,
supra note 9, at 88, 95-96.
17. See, e.g., David W. Breneman et al., The Contemporary Provision of For-Profit
Higher Education, in EARNINGS FROM LEARNING, supra note 1 ( “[I]nitial research on
‘hybrid’ institutional forms suggests that the increasing adoption of commercial
behavior in nonprofit higher education institutions represents a potentially problematic
convergence of non-profit and for-profit forms.”) (internal citation omitted).
18. Compare Tracy Jan, Full UMass Board Gives Nod to Law School Plan,
BOSTON.COM (Dec. 10, 2009), http://www.boston.com/news/local/breaking_news

2012]

FACULTY LEVERAGED BUYOUTS

393

non-traditional organizational architectures, however, may lead to
shocking results for the law students who attend these schools and the
tenure-track faculty who teach there, potentially subjecting all of a law
school’s stakeholder constituencies—including society as the ultimate
consumer of legal services—to undesirable spillover effects.19
Dubiously dovetailing into and exacerbating the foregoing
discussion of law schools’ marketized activity is the provocative content
of a recent proposal by the A.B.A.’s Standards Review Committee (the
“A.B.A. Committee” or the “SRC”) to eliminate faculty tenure from the
A.B.A.’s law school accreditation standards (the “A.B.A. Proposal”).20
In response, many tenured and tenure-track law professors stated that
the A.B.A. Proposal directly impacts job security,21 as well as their
already eroding academic freedom.22 This harmonic convergence of law
/2009/12/full_umass_boar.html (discussing UMass-Dartmouth’s 2009 purchase of the
Southern New England School of Law), with Pauline Repard, UCSD, Cal Western
Talks for Law School Suspended, SIGNONSANDIEGO.COM (Apr. 6, 2011),
http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/2011/apr/06/ucsd-cal-western-merger-talkslaw-school-called/ (reporting on the recently terminated merger talks between the
California Western School of Law and the University of California San Diego). See
also infra note 23 regarding University of New Hampshire’s potential acquisition of the
Franklin Pierce Law School.
19. For definitions of spillover effects as economic externalities, see generally
David G. Post & David R. Johnson, “Chaos Prevailing on Every Continent”: Towards
A New Theory of Decentralized Decision-Making in Complex Systems, 73 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 1055, 1060 n.12 (1998) (stating that “[t]he notion of a spillover effect is similar to
the familiar concept of an ‘externality.’ In its most common usage, an ‘externality’
describes a spillover effect that has the additional characteristic that it is not the subject
of a market transaction.”); Steven R. Salbu, Public Health and International Law:
Regulation of Borderless High-Technology Economies: Managing Spillover Effects, 3
CHI. J. INT’L L. 137, 140 n.15 (2002) (defining spillover effects as “effects of conduct
[that] extend beyond pre-established geographical boundaries—or ‘spill over’ into other
jurisdictions”).
20. See Karen Sloan, Law Faculty Upset Over A.B.A.’s Proposed Tenure Shift, THE
NAT’L L.J., July 27, 2010 (stating that the committee reviewing the A.B.A.’s
accreditation standards does not believe that A.B.A.-accredited law schools should be
required to maintain a tenure system).
21. Id.
22. See, e.g., Widener Professor Could Lose Job for Hypothetical Talk of Dean’s
Shooting, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (Feb. 14, 2011), http://chronicle.com/blogs/ticker
/widener-professor-could-lose-job-for-hypothetical-talk-of-deans-shooting/30461
[hereinafter Widener Professor Could Lose Job] (stating that “[a] tenured professor at
the Widener University School of Law has been placed on administrative leave and is
fighting to keep his job after students complained about his frequent hypothetical
references in class to the school’s dean being shot. The newspaper reported today that
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schools’ creative financing, M&A activity, and the A.B.A. Committee’s
anti-tenure proposal arguably means that the owners of CFLSs have
incentives to: (1) exacerbate the stripping of assets from law schools to
affiliated entities, which caused a law school dean to resign in July
2011;23 (2) cause financial exigency to the law school due to the lack of
resources; (3) terminate faculty tenure due to such financial exigency;
(4) reorganize the school with an entirely adjunctified and term-contract
(i.e., outsourced)24 faculty that fits the modern marketized higher
the students complained . . . partly because they regarded his hypothetical discussions . .
. as violent, racist, and sexist. . . . [The professor’s] lawyer accused the [dean] of going
after [him] because of his conservative views.”) (emphasis added).
23. Such diversion of funds currently occurs at rates of anywhere between twentyfive to forty-five percent of some law schools’ revenues. See, e.g., UB Law School
Dean Closius’ Resignation Letter, BALTIMORE BUS. J. (July 29, 2011), available at
http://www.bizjournals.com/baltimore/news/2011/07/29/ub-law-school-deanclosius.html?page=all [hereinafter Closius’ Resignation Letter]. The outgoing Dean of
the University of Baltimore School of Law stated that “[a]s of academic year 2010-11,
the University retained approximately 45% of the revenue generated by law tuition, fees
and state subsidy. Using any reasonable calculation of the direct and indirect University
costs, the University was still diverting millions of dollars in law school revenue to nonlaw University functions.” Id; see also David Segal, Law School Economics: KaChing!, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2011, at BU-1 (quoting Lawrence E. Mitchell, the
incoming dean of the Case Western Reserve University School of Law as stating,
“having just come from a two-day meeting of new and current deans organized by the
American Bar Association, I can tell you that some law schools pay 25 or even 30
percent [to subsidize other parts of their universities]”). Some academics call this
process “cross-subsidization.” See, e.g., ROBERT ZEMSKY ET AL., REMAKING THE
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY MARKET-SMART AND MISSION-CENTERED 62-66 (Rutgers Univ.
Press 2005). This Article employs “asset stripping” and “cross subsidization” to
connote the same concept, depending on context. Law school asset stripping occurs
despite approximately 80% of law students using financial aid—the key to law schools’
revenue models, detailed infra Part II—to finance their legal educations. See Ryan
Brown, As Graduate-Student Population Grows, So Does Its Reliance on Financial
Aid, July 26, 2011, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., http://chronicle.com/article/As-GraduateStudent-Population/128402/. Cf. Karen Langley, UNH, Law Merger Nears: No Rush to
Move Franklin Pierce, CONCORD MONITOR, May 8, 2009 (quoting University of New
Hampshire Vice President for Planning and Budgeting in the context of UNH’s
potential acquisition of Franklin Pierce Law School as stating “[w]e aren’t looking for
[the law school] to contribute their profits to UNH . . . . If this happens, we want to
maintain a strong law school, which means reinvesting in the law school to make it
even better.”).
24. The reader should not confuse the term outsourcing with offshoring.
“Outsourcing,” for example, “is sending work traditionally handled inside a company or
firm to an outside contractor for performance.” Maria L. Proctor, Considerations in
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education institute (“HEI”) business model, lacking academic freedom,
faculty governance, and tenure; and thereby (5) control a law school
whose mission is to maximize the enterprise’s financial value,25 on the
backs of law students’ tuition dollars that flow from financial aid
sources, regardless of faculty quality or student experience. Such a
process would likely lead to the next generation of legal professionals
being bar-pass-ready but otherwise financially, intellectually, and
interpersonally unprepared to advise society’s legal services consumers.
Part I of this Article provides an historical overview of faculty
governance, academic freedom, and tenure. This synopsis includes the
policy push behind tenure’s existence at the collegiate level coming at
the height of the U.S. government’s anti-Communist investigations.26
Specifically, this Part analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of a tenurebased system in the context of a law school faculty and its benefits for
law students. This Part also discusses the rationale behind faculty
governance at law schools, describes the interrelationship between
faculty governance and tenure, and provides examples of how private
owners of some schools have chipped away at faculty governance,27
while perhaps nudging the A.B.A. Committee to take an anti-tenure
stance. With a nod to the proposed solution in Part IV, and despite
tenure’s many drawbacks, Part I concludes that in legal education, the
security that faculty governance, academic freedom, and tenure bring to
a law professor’s scholarly research, publishing, and teaching ensures a

Outsourcing Legal Work, MICH. B.J., Sept. 2005, at 20. “Offshoring,” however, refers
to “the transfer of work to a foreign country, whether it is performed by another office
of the same company or a separate company.” Jessica Schauer, Book Note, Federal
Trade Adjustment Assistance for Workers: Broken Equipment, 26 B.C. THIRD WORLD
L.J. 397, 398 n.5 (2006) (reviewing THOMAS FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT: A BRIEF
HISTORY OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2005)) (referencing C. Alan Garner,
Offshoring in the Service Sector: Economic Impact and Policy Issues, ECON. REV., 3d
Quarter 2004, at 5).
25. For example, corporate “[m]anagers and board members . . . should set longterm shareholder value creation as their primary objective.” KOLLER ET AL., supra note
2, at 4. Meanwhile “‘nonprofits maximize profits and distribute them in disguised form
(as higher wages and perks), or they may maximize revenues that lead to power and
prestige for their managers.’” SLAUGHTER & RHOADES, supra note 10, at 334 (quoting
E. James, Commercialism Among Nonprofits: Objectives, Opportunities, and
Constraints, in TO PROFIT OR NOT TO PROFIT: THE COMMERCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF
THE NONPROFIT SECTOR 273 (B.A. Weisbrod, ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1998)).
26. See, e.g., Walter P. Metzger, Dissent, On Institutional Mergers and
Acquisitions, 68:2 ACADEME 1a, 4a-7a (Mar.-Apr. 1982).
27. See, e.g., infra note 62 (discussing faculty governance in greater detail).
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critical piece of a properly functioning law school’s organizational
architecture and societal legal system.
Part II then analyzes the creative financing of marketized HEIs,
ostensibly including public law schools that are actually private,28 quasiprivate,29 closely held corporate,30 and publicly held corporate31 law
schools. This Part reviews marketized HEIs’ and law schools’ general
business models. These business models typically generate revenues
largely from student loan debt sources while the law school’s controlling
entity then diverts between twenty-five and forty-five percent of those
revenues to other, non-law school functions of a university.32 Part II next
evidences that law schools recently became attractive target candidates
for corporate-like M&A activity. The University of California San
Diego’s failed attempt to acquire the California Western School of Law
in early 2011,33 and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts’ successful
acquisition of the formerly named Southern New England School of
Law in early 201034 illustrate recent law school M&A activity and
demonstrate the issue’s relevance and timeliness. Such activity provides
a rationale for using law schools’ financial statements as an analytic in
proposing this Article’s solution in Part IV.
Part III argues that in such a paradigm, where law school owners
and the A.B.A. ease the ability for outsourced faculty to replace
traditional tenure-track law professors, and in which reorganization
activity increasingly becomes a recurring concern for law schools, law
students would witness a materially worsened law school experience
than exists today.35 In such a world, law students likely would be denied
28. See, e.g., REEVES BRACCO & DOYLE, supra note 10 (regarding Michigan State
University College of Law).
29. See, e.g, Lee, supra note 12 (referencing the University of Virginia School of
Law).
30. See, e.g,. Repard, supra text accompanying note 18 (discussing the California
Western School of Law).
31. See, e.g, EDMC 10-K, supra note 3, at 13 (discussing Western State University
College of Law).
32.
See Closius’ Resignation Letter, supra note 23; see also Segal supra note 23.
33. See, e.g., Repard, supra note 18 (regarding the California Western-University
of California, San Diego merger discussions).
34. See, e.g., Jan, supra note 18 (evidencing the Commonwealth of Massachusetts’
successful acquisition of the Southern New England School of Law).
35. See, e.g., Sloan, supra note 20 (The security that comes with tenure is the only
way to ensure that faculty will remain free to teach, research, participate in governance
decisions, and speak on matters of public concern without fear of reprisal,’ reads a letter

2012]

FACULTY LEVERAGED BUYOUTS

397

the ability, for example, to wrestle with controversial hypotheticals in
class, which some administrators have begun to squelch.36 Outside of
class, this encroaching paradigm would result in a variety of spillover
effects to traditional law schools. For example, student-run law reviews
would receive significantly fewer manuscripts to publish, not only
because academic freedom would no longer exist to protect professors’
scholarly ideas but also because outsourced faculty generally face no
research or publication requirements. Such a constriction would
correspondingly limit opportunities for law students to obtain the
hallmark resume credential throughout a lawyer’s career—service on a
law journal—and would lead outsourced faculty to free-ride on the
scholarship produced by faculty at schools able to withstand the
competitive pressures of a marketized HEI environment.37 Part III
concludes that the paradigm that this Article describes, and in which law
and other professional schools are finding themselves in larger numbers,
is a meaningful threat to all of a law school’s stakeholders, from the
student-consumer to professors to alumni to society.
Part IV articulates this Article’s solution to a world of (1) creatively
financed law schools where (2) corporate-like M&A activity regularly
occurs, (3) financial exigency is likely to follow, and (4) law professors’
job security and faculty governance models become threatened.
Specifically, this Part proposes to embrace and integrate academic
capitalism by applying core tenets of corporate law and finance in a
pragmatic but yet unheard of manner to law schools—a faculty
leveraged buyout (“FLBO”). Just as a mortgage enables an individual or
family to purchase a residential home via the use of financial leverage
(debt), the leverage piece of a FLBO would permit a law school’s
faculty to finance the purchase of the law school entity from the law
that the Society of American Law Teachers has submitted to the Standards Review
Committee.”).
36. See Widener Professor Could Lose Job, supra note 22.
37. See, e.g., David W. Breneman, The University of Phoenix: Icon of For-Profit
Higher Education, in EARNINGS FROM LEARNING, supra note 1, at 71, 87 (
“[Phoenix] could not exist were it not for the scholarly and publishing works
of faculty in traditional institutions. Essentially, [Phoenix] rides on the availability
of scholarly knowledge generated elsewhere, and packages that knowledge
effectively . . . [A] global economic analysis of [Phoenix] would have to credit
traditional academia with generating an enormous externality for [its] benefit . . . .
[A]n entire educational system populated only with [Phoenix]-type institutions
would be intellectually barren and would not produce new knowledge. [Phoenix]
thus depends critically upon the existence of the traditional sector for most of its
intellectual input and for its ultimate success.”).

398

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XVII

school’s existing owners. The FLBO mechanism would allow law
professors to regain control and governance of their schools, despite the
faculty members likely lacking the collective personal wealth to do so.
To restore full faculty governance of the law school as an institution,
this Part (a) employs traditional business valuation methodologies to
arrive at a typical law school’s generic financial value, and then (b)
implores law professors at creatively financed law schools to enlist
investment banks38 to underwrite tens of millions of dollars of high yield
debt to fund the buyout. With the faculty driving the FLBO process, the
law school entities themselves would constitute the issuers39 of the
FLBO debt that the investment bank would sell to the investing public.
As a result, the law school’s traditional cash flows would cover the
required principal and interest payments to the bondholders40 to whom
the investment bank sold the debt securities that financed the FLBO.41
Part IV concludes that FLBOs would enable tenured law professors to
function as theoretical law firm partners or corporate principals, while
tenure-track junior faculty would mirror associates in law firms or
corporate structures, with the added compensation incentive beyond
tenure of obtaining an equity42 interest in the law school. In addition,
law schools could use equity rewards for non-faculty stakeholders as
well, such as for alumni bar passage or career accomplishments.
This Article concludes that given the (a) existing financial
engineering occurring at many law schools; (b) current A.B.A. Proposal
against law professor tenure; (c) erosion of faculty governance in the
face of competitive economic pressures in the HEI marketplace; (d)
recent corporate-like M&A activity involving law schools; and (e)
38.
39.

See infra Part IV.
See generally 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(4) (2006); 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(8) (defining
“issuer” generally as a “person who issues or proposes to issue any security”).
40. For purposes of this Article, the terms “debt,” “leverage,” “bonds,” “notes,”
“indentures,” and “debentures” have substantially the same meaning. See, e.g., George
S. Corey, M. Wayne Marr, Jr. & Michael F. Spivey, Are Bondholders Owed a
Fiduciary Duty?, 18 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 971, 972-74 (1991).
41. Or this party could also be a holder who obtained the debt via a secondary
market transaction. See Kevin N. Peter, Comments: Section 12(2) of the Securities Act
of 1933: Does it Apply to the Secondary Market? The Circuits are Fighting, 31 HOUS.
L. REV. 1205 (1994).
42. “Equity” here means an equity security (i.e., stock ownership), not the fairness
of a court of equity. See generally Barry P. Barbash, Phillip Isom & Stephen O’Conner,
SEC Adopts Rule Defining “Venture Capital Fund” for Purposes Of Exemption From
the Investment Advisers Act, 19 METRO. CORP. COUNSEL 26 (N.E. Ed. September 2011).
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potential for law schools’ owners to eliminate tenure through financial
exigency claims43—combined with highly sophisticated financial
contracts44—law school faculties should consider new options.
Specifically, this Article asserts that law professors should step
down from their ivory towers and acknowledge the real-world threat that
faces them. That threat comes from law school owners who desire to
maximize their financial interests by stripping law school assets and
outsourcing professors’ jobs via eliminating tenure and outsourcing the
law schools’ instructors. To restore full faculty governance and secure a
meaningful system of academic freedom in terms of scholarly research,
publication, and teaching capacity, professors at CFLSs can
capitalistically engage in FLBOs. Despite having a profound impact on
both the legal profession and financial markets, the issues upon which
this Article attempts to spark debate admittedly reside in the rarely
enmeshed but highly technical interdisciplinary area of law, market
economics, higher education, and modern finance. Yet if left
undiscussed and misunderstood, these issues may unsuspectingly
whipsaw all of a law school’s stakeholders, for whom a FLBO could
otherwise generate meaningful value.
I. ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND TENURE IN HIGHER EDUCATION
As law professor Mark L. Adams stated, “[f]or a professor, tenure
is often viewed as the ‘Holy Grail’ of academic employment,45 a
43. See, e.g., Gwen Seaquist & Eileen Kelly, Faculty Dismissal Because of
Enrollment Declines, 28 J.L. & EDUC. 193, 194-99 (1999) (exploring the definition of
“financial exigency”).
44. See infra note 228 (defining and detailing Credit Default Swaps (“CDS”),
empty creditors, and the procedural decoupling of economic interests from ownership
and creditor interests).
45. Compare Ashby Jones, Are Law Professors Just Plain Lazy, WALL ST. J. L.
BLOG (Feb. 3, 2010, 3:45 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/02/03/are-law-professors
-just-plain-lazy/ (quoting Washington University Law Professor Brian Tamanaha’s
assertion that “most of the time [tenure] functions to confer immunity on professors to
work as little as they please beyond teaching their assigned classes . . . impos[ing] a
high cost on law schools (in money as well as institutional productivity and morale).”),
with MONTY PYTHON AND THE HOLY GRAIL (Python Pictures 1975).
Bridgekeeper: “What . . . is your quest?”
Sir Lancelot: “To seek the Holy Grail.”
Bridgekeeper: “What. . . is your favourite colour?”
Sir Lancelot: “Blue.”
Bridgekeeper: “Go on. Off you go.”
Sir Lancelot: “Oh, thank you. Thank you very much.”
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potentially quixotic pursuit that may yield great rewards.”46
Understanding a general history of faculty tenure, therefore, and its
relationship to academic freedom and professional higher education,
helps to underpin the reader’s ability to contextualize both the panic and
blindness of faculty working in a rapidly marketized environment that
embraces the HEI business model described infra Part II.
A. THE GROWTH OF LANGDELLIAN PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION AND THE
AAUP
Seven years after the death of Stanford University’s founder,
Leland Stanford, his widow had taken effective control of Stanford
University.47 In 1900, Mrs. Stanford terminated noted economist and
professor Edward Ross because Mrs. Stanford’s views regarding
immigrant labor and railroads clashed with the professor’s.48 Most
American universities at that time were proprietary,49 or privately
owned, leaving professors without the First Amendment rights enjoyed
by faculty at publicly owned schools.50 Following this event, because
professors “began to conceive of themselves not as mere employees, but
as professional scholars who were answerable to the professional
judgment of their peers, they began to create the idea of academic
freedom.”51 This era led to two significant events relative to this
Article’s analysis.

Sir Robin: “That’s easy.”

Id. (emphasis added); see also Brian Tamanaha, Straight Talk About Tenure,
BALKINIZATION BLOGSPOT, (May 8, 2007), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2007/05/straighttalk-about-tenure.html.
46. Mark L. Adams, The Quest for Tenure: Job Security and Academic Freedom,
56 CATH. U. L. REV. 67, 68 (2006).
47. Robert Post, Presentation at the Academic Freedom Forum: Academic
Freedom, Its History and Evolution Within the UC System, 1 (June 11, 2003),
http://www.universityofcalifornia.edu/senate/committees/ucaf/afforum/post.pdf;
see
generally Stanford University, Jane L. Stanford: The Woman Behind Stanford
University, HISTORY OF STANFORD UNIVERSITY, http://janestanford.stanford.edu/bio
graphy.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2012, 4:52 PM).
48. Why Tenure is an Important Institution: Tenure and Promotion at Penn State,
PENN STATE ALUMNI LIBRARY, http://alumni.libraries.psu.edu/tenureimpo.html (last
visited July 29, 2011).
49. Post, supra note 47, at 1.
50. See id.
51. Id.
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First, the education of future lawyers and other professionals
shifted from apprenticeships to law and professional schools.52 By the
late nineteenth century, legendary Harvard Law School Dean
Christopher Columbus Langdell “viewed academic merit as the means
not only to elevate the legal profession but also to safeguard the integrity
of the legal system.”53 Langdell instituted the requirement of a
bachelor’s degree prior to entering law school, a three-year course of
academic study, and scholarly requirements combined with “the
independent career track for faculty.”54 Langdell’s achievements at
Harvard Law School spread nationwide:
[Langdell’s] enduring legacy lies in his system of academic
meritocracy that proliferated throughout American professional
education over the course of the twentieth century. Indeed, it is no
exaggeration to say that every professional school in the United
States since the mid-twentieth century has felt the impress of the
system that Langdell invented and instituted” in the late nineteenth
55
century.

Second, in response to actions such as Mrs. Stanford’s, professors’
complaints led to an American Economic Association investigation,
which ultimately resulted in the creation of the American Association of
University Professors (“AAUP”).56 The AAUP’s initial public
pronouncement regarding academic freedom and tenure occurred in
1915.57 In a nutshell, the 1915 Declaration claimed that “[n]either the
owners of proprietary universities nor the public, who owned state
universities, could presume to judge the professional work of
professors.”58 The 1915 Declaration asserted that “Academic freedom
comprises three elements: freedom of inquiry and research; freedom of
teaching in the university or college; and freedom of extramural
utterance or action.” The 1915 Declaration described tenure as
encompassing basic ideas such as institutional understandings of the
52.
53.

Id.
BRUCE A. KIMBALL, THE INCEPTION OF MODERN PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION C.
C. LANGDELL 1826-1906 5 (Univ. of N.C. Press 2009).
54. Id. at 7.
55. Id. at 8-9.
56. Post, supra note 47, at 1.
57. General Report of the Committee on Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure,
1 BULL AM. ASS’N. U. PROFESSORS, 15, 16 (Dec. 1915), available at http://www.
jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/40216731.pdf?acceptTC=true
[hereinafter
1915
AAUP
Declaration].
58. Post, supra note 47, at 2.
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appointment of a faculty member’s term, with a permanent appointment
following a certain length of service, which a university could only
revoke based on clear, enumerated, legitimate grounds following an
institutional notice and hearing.59
The AAUP revisited academic freedom and tenure in landmark
fashion via its 1940 Statement of Principles.60 After couching higher
education as a public good,61 the 1940 AAUP asserted that:
Tenure is a means to certain ends; specifically: (1) [f]reedom of
teaching and research and of extra-mural activities, and (2) [a]
sufficient degree of economic security to make the profession
attractive to men and women of ability. Freedom and economic
security, hence tenure, are indispensable to the success of an
62
institution in fulfilling its obligations to its students and to society.

In other words, self-regulation should rule in academia, with
decisions made via faculty governance. Faculty play a “key role . . . in
determining policy, at least in ‘not for profit’ institutions.”63
Beyond these policy statements, the AAUP has nearly consistently
defended academic freedom and tenure in higher education, with some
significant historical successes.64 As Walter Metzger stated, the AAUP
took a “libertarian position on the Communist issue in the McCarthy
period [that sought to dismiss academics suspected of having communist
ties]. Tenure is our stock-in-trade; if we don’t defend it against the
59.
60.

See 1915 AAUP Declaration, supra note 57, at 40-42.
Academic Freedom and Tenure: Statement of Principles, 1940, 27 BUL. AM.
ASS’N. U. PROFESSORS 40, 40 (Feb. 1941), available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/
pdfplus/40219177.pdf?acceptTC=true [hereinafter 1940 AAUP Statement]; see also
Walter P. Metzger, The 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and
Tenure, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 6 (1990) (stating, hyperbolically, that AAUP
“Committee A incants the words and phrases of the 1940 Statement with a reverence
usually reserved for the hymning of a doxology, and the AAUP Washington staff
ponders its every word with an exegetical skill that invites comparison with that of
gospel hermeneuts and Talmudic scholars”).
61. Cf. infra note 125 (describing higher education as an arguable public benefit).
62. 1940 AAUP Statement, supra note 60, at 41.
63. BROWN, supra note 9, at 26. For a detailed discussion of faculty governance,
see, e.g., Gabriel Kaplan, Governing the Privatized Public Research University, in
PRIVATIZING THE PUBLIC UNIVERSITY, supra note 9, at 120-24.
64. Membership Brochure, AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS (Aug. 25, 2010),
http://www.aaup.org/NR/rdonlyres/ECD0804A-FB73-4BD2-A93D-597164D8B790/0
/2012membershipapplication.pdf.
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contrary tide and hope to be vindicated by posterity, who will?”65
Professor Matthew W. Finkin wrote, “[t]he AAUP’s raison d’être is the
defense of tenure.”66 As a result, Dean Langdell drove professional
education’s transformation from apprenticeships into a scholarly pursuit,
and the AAUP sought to protect the scholarship of the professoriate via
a near-obsession on the importance of scholarly freedom and tenure
within academia.67
B. THE A.B.A.
As legal education settled into its new home within law schools, the
A.B.A. became parasitically involved in these schools’ admissions
processes and ultimate accreditation to increase students’ ability to sit
for a state bar exam of their choosing upon graduation.68 During the

65.
66.

Metzger, supra note 26, at 7a.
Mathew W. Finkin, In Defense of the Majority, On Institutional Mergers and
Acquisitions, 68 ACADEME 2, 1a, 8a (Mar.-Apr. 1982).
67. For arguments against tenure in the modern landscape, see generally STEPHEN
H. ABY & JAMES C. KUHN IV, ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A GUIDE TO THE LITERATURE,
BIBLIOGRAPHIES AND INDEXES IN EDUCATION NUMBER 20, at 154-55, 162-63, 166-67
(Greenwood Press 2000); Stanley Fish, Vocationalism, Academic Freedom and Tenure,
N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 2011, 8:30 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011
/07/11/vocationalism-academic-freedom-and-tenure/?nl=todaysheadlines&emc=thab1
(reviewing Naomi Schaeffer Reiley’s book THE FACULTY LOUNGES: AND OTHER
REASONS WHY YOU WON’T GET THE COLLEGE EDUCATION YOU PAID FOR and
discussing Reiley’s conclusion that “[t]here is no reason why tenure shouldn’t be
abolished at the vast majority of the four thousand degree-granting colleges and
universities in the United States.”).
What Riley shows is that vocation-oriented teaching, teaching beholden to
corporations and politically inflected teaching do not square with the picture of
academic labor assumed by the institutions of tenure and academic freedom. She says
that, given the direction colleges and universities are going in, faculty members have
little claim to the protection of doctrines that were fashioned for an academy that
holds itself aloof from real world issues, either political or mercantile.

Fish, supra note 67.
68. See Comprehensive Guide to Bar Admission Requirements 2012, NATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAMINERS, http://www.ncbex.org/assets/media_files/CompGuide/CompGuide.pdf (last visited May 5, 2012). Few exceptions exist for students to
sit for a bar exam without attending an A.B.A.-accredited law school. See, e.g.,
California-accredited schools whose graduates are prohibited from taking another
state’s bar exam. Admission and Educational Standards, CALIFORNIA BAR,
http://rules.calbar.ca.gov/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=5LAwXeKsh6U%3d&tabid=1227
(last visited May 5, 2012) (warning that a legal education from an unaccredited law
school may not satisfy other jurisdictions’ educational requirements to sit for the bar,
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twentieth century, the A.B.A. transformed into a socio-economically
powerful rent-seeking cartel69 that—until required by judicial order in
the mid-1990s—protected law professors to the point of arguably setting
minimum salary requirements for A.B.A.-accredited faculty.70 At the
same time, while shamelessly seeking to expand its anti-competitive
position, the A.B.A. fought to prevent proprietary law schools from
obtaining A.B.A.-accreditation. In fact, the A.B.A. would not accredit a
for-profit law school until the U.S. Justice Department successfully sued
the A.B.A. in the mid-1990s for alleged violations of the Sherman
Antitrust Act.71
thereby denying students at these CalBar schools the opportunity to sit for another
state’s bar examination).
69. See, e.g., Arthur Austin, Ivy League Price-Fixing: Conflict From the
Intersection of Education and Commerce, 21 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 1, 5
(2006) (describing the MIT/Ivy League arrangement as “[t]he coupling of the nation’s
most prestigious institutions, all located within shouting—collusion—distance,
produced a synergized form of market power. The longevity of the arrangement
certifies its success in maintaining cartel discipline.”); George C. Christie, Symposium:
Legal Education in an Era of Change, The Recruitment of Law Faculty, 1987 DUKE L.J.
306, 314 (1987) (arguing that a need exists to maintain a minimum workload for law
faculties); John S. Elson, The Governmental Maintenance of the Privileges of Legal
Academia: A Case Study in Classic Rent-Seeking and a Challenge to Our Democratic
Ideology, 15 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 269, 281 n.34 (2001) (citing, inter alia,
Mark Glick, Is Monopoly Rent Seeking Compatible with Wealth Maximization?, 1994
BYU L. REV. 499, 499 (1994)); Elson, supra note 69, at 284 n.49 (referencing, inter
alia, Daniel Wise, A.B.A. to Alter Accreditation Process: Federal Civil Antitrust
Complaint Settled, N.Y.L.J., June 1995, at 1); Richard C. Reuben, An Alternative Law
School Sues A.B.A.: Massachusetts Dean Challenges Association’s “Monopoly Power”
in Accreditation, 80 A.B.A.. J. 25, 25 (1994) (citing the claim of Dean Lawrence R.
Velvel of Massachussets School of Law, that the A.B.A.’s cartel power increased
salaries and decreased law faculty workloads); George B. Shepherd & William G.
Shepherd, Scholarly Restraint? A.B.A. Accreditation and Legal Education, 19
CARDOZO L. REV. 2091, 2114, 2135 (1998) (claiming that A.B.A. accreditation
standards inure to the sole benefit of a law school’s faculty, leaving students supporting
the revenues); see also infra text accompanying notes 132-133.
70. See generally Mass. Sch. of Law at Andover v. United States, 118 F.3d 776
(D.C. Cir. 1997); Standards for Approval of Law Schools and Interpretations, 1994
A.B.A., Standard 405(b) [hereinafter, A.B.A. Standard 405(b)].
71. Editorial Article, What Is Going On With Western State and the A.B.A.? An
Examination of Western State University’s Bid to Obtain American Bar Association
Approval, 31 W. ST. U. L. REV., 265, 272-274 (2004); see also NCAA v. Board of
Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 110 (1984) ( “[A]naked restraint on price and
output requires some competitive justification even in the absence of a detailed market
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Since then, the HEI environment has become more marketized,
regardless of the perceived public, private, for-profit, or non-profit
nature of the institution.72 Unusual activities among the A.B.A. and
some of its member schools are now occurring. For example, the
A.B.A.’s Standards Review Committee has recommended that the
A.B.A. no longer require accredited law schools to maintain a tenure
policy per A.B.A. Standard 405(b).73 The A.B.A.’s new position on
tenure has met swift response from the legal academy in general74 but
also from University of Pennsylvania Emeritus Law Professor Robert A.
Gorman, former President of the American Association of Law Schools
(“AALS”), a more elite group of law schools given that member schools
cannot apply for AALS membership until five years after A.B.A.
accreditation,75 and former President of the AAUP. Moreover, the
AAUP itself submitted its concerns to the A.B.A.’s Standards Review
analysis.”). As a result, the A.B.A. had little legal ground on which to stand because
CFLSs enhance competition in higher education, an admittedly commercial activity.
Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) ( “{T]here are certain
agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect on competition and
lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and
therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or
the business excuse for their use.”); Michael C. Petronio, Comment, Eliminating the
Social Cost of Higher Education: The Third Circuit Allows Social Benefits to Justify
Horizontal Restraints of Trade in United States v. Brown, 83 GEO. L.J. 189, 192, 193
n.25 (1994) (stating that “[s]ection 1 of the Sherman Act provides that ‘[e]very contract,
combination in the form of trust or . . . conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several states . . . is declared to be illegal.’ However . . . [a] spectrum of
analytical standards for determining whether conduct constitutes an unreasonable
restraint of trade has emerged from Supreme Court precedent.”) (citing, inter alia,
Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918)) (“The true test of
legality [under the Sherman Act] is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely
regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may
suppress or even destroy competition.”); see also infra text accompanying notes 134135 (describing higher education as commercial activity).
72. See infra Part II (discussing marketized higher education in detail).
73. See, e.g., Letter from Robert A. Gorman to A.B.A. Standards Review
Committee (July 5, 2010); A.B.A. Standard 405(b) (urging the preservation of law
school’s maintenance of “an established and announced policy with respect to academic
freedom and tenure” as a condition precedent to A.B.A. accreditation).
74. See Sloan, supra note 20.
75. In addition, the AALS requires tenure. See AALS HANDBOOK: MEMBERSHIP
REQS., BYLAWS AND EXEC. COMM. REGS. PERTAINING TO THE REQS. OF MEMBERSHIP,
available at http://www.aals.org/about_handbook_requirements.php ( “[A] faculty
member shall have academic freedom and tenure in accordance with the principles of
the [AAUP].”).
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Committee, attaching to its letter a Statement citing the 1915
Declaration and the 1940 Statement and their relationship to law
schools.76
Regardless, little time passed between Professor Gorman’s and the
AAUP’s letters to the A.B.A.’s Standards Review Committee and one
law school dean’s attempt to overtly challenge her faculty’s academic
freedom and tenure.77 During the 2010-11 academic year, the dean of
two privately owned law schools,78 Linda Ammons, was so offended by
a tenured faculty member’s in-class hypotheticals, which are typical for
law school classes,79 that she attempted to dismiss that professor for
using such hypotheticals.80 In late July 2011, a process of faculty
governance exonerated the conservative law professor81 whose civil
complaint alleges the dean’s attempts to “violate his academic freedom
in the classroom”82 and “retaliate against” him “for his . . . political and
legal views.”83 Moreover, “highly structured labor markets” such as
those in academia, “and the institution of tenure limit the ability of
nonprofit providers to adapt quickly to changes . . . ”84

76. Letter from Cary Nelson, President, Am. Ass’n of Univ. Professors, to Donald
J. Polden, Dean, Santa Clara Univ. Sch. of L., and Margret Marin Barry, Professor,
Columbus Sch. of L. (July 1, 2010), available at http://www.saltlaw.org/userfiles/file
/SALT%20PDF%20Documents%20/7-19-10_Comment%20-%20security%20of%20
position%20AAUP%20July%202010.pdf.
77. Robert L. Shibley, Widener Law School Attempting to Fire Professor for
Classroom Speech, Foundation for Individual Rights in Education (Mar. 23, 2011);
Adam Kissel, The Persecution of a Professor, FRONTPAGE MAG (July 27, 2011),
http://frontpagemag.com/2011/07/27/the-persecution -of-a-professor/.
78. Widener University has two law schools, one in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, and
the other constituting Delaware’s sole law school.
79. Plaintiff’s Restated and Amended Complaint ¶ 20, Connell v. Ammons, No.
S11C-04-010 ESB (Del. Super. Ct. July 4, 2011) (“Professors from other law schools
have testified as expert witnesses for plaintiff that this teaching methodology is within
the pedagogical mainstream of U.S. law schools.”).
80. See, e.g., John Irving, Widener Law Professor Exonerated, NAT’L ACAD. OF
SCHOLARS
(July
21,
2011),
http://www.nas.org/articles/Widener_Law_Professor_Exonerated.
81. Id.
82. Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint ¶ 18, Connell v. Ammons, No. S11C-04010 ESB (Del. Super. Ct., July 11, 2011), available at http://thefire.org/public
/pdfs/475d3507d952d5ba15a5a0fee067ede5.pdf?direct.
83. Id. ¶ 24.
84. BRENEMAN ET AL., supra note 17, at 11.
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C. THE DISCONNECT BETWEEN MARKETIZED HEIS
AND ENDURING AAUP PRINCIPLES
Despite the correspondence drafted by the current AAUP president
and a former AAUP and AALS president, the AAUP’s words alone
regarding law faculty tenure lack sufficient power to protect law faculty
in a dynamic and marketized HEI environment.85 As a result,
understanding the basic contours of how tenure and academic freedom
function in the current academically capitalist HEI landscape, proves
essential to digesting the detailed financial and business analytics
presented infra in Parts II and IV, respectively. First, the term
“‘academic capitalism’ involves institutions . . . expanding managerial
professions and managerial capacity, and in restratifying academic
fields.”86 Moreover, “[a]cademic capitalism is sometimes met with
confusion or resistance at the department level.”87 Some scholars have
claimed that marketization has caused academics to be “cynical,”
“bitter,” and “not just anxious but truly angry.”88 However, rather than
resisting academic capitalism or being confused, cynical, or angered by
it, this Article instead embraces capitalist ideas and market theory to
develop its solution to the problems faced directly by law faculty (and
indirectly by other stakeholders, including students, alumni, and the
general public) in a marketized HEI landscape.
But before getting there, the reader must understand the broader
context overhanging the current HEI marketplace. For example, “[i]n
traditional colleges and universities, one speaks of governance and of
administration, but less often of management,”89 which represents the
appropriate term in a for-profit arena. The President of perhaps the best
known marketized university,90 the University of Phoenix (“Phoenix”),
stated “‘The AAUP statement on shared governance doesn’t work here.
This is not the same sort of organization. [Phoenix] has always distinctly
divided the academic issues from the management issues . . . The
management . . . is done by professional management, not by

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

See supra note 77.
SLAUGHTER & RHOADES, supra note 9, at 308.
Id. at 333.
ZEMSKY ET AL., supra note 23, at 52.
Breneman, supra note 37, at 84.
Id. at 71.
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academics.”91 Another Phoenix administrator “specifically argues that
the lack of tenured faculty has allowed the organization to innovate.”92
Additionally, an outside scholar wrote, that lacking tenure is one of the
“defining characteristics” of for-profit institutions.93
Marketized HEIs employ several factors that contradict the
Langdellian model of legal education. First, marketized HEIs recognize
that they must spend greater resources to ensure revenue growth.94
Those resources must come from the largest cost center – faculty
salaries.95 “[T]he marketing of educational services requires staff able to
compete with other institutions and organizations to capture market
share. The more the market activity, the greater the managerial staff; the
more the managerial staff,”96 and the greater the managerial staff, the
less room exists, therefore, for faculty governance.
[C]olleges and universities have greatly expanded middle
management . . . The managerial, nonfaculty professionals who
manage . . . activity are less directly focused than are faculty on
teaching and research, and more closely linked to intermediating
networks of senior administrators involved in promoting universitybusiness cooperation and partnership, and new economy academic
capitalism. Institutional expenditures for administration go up, while
97
expenditures for instruction go down.

Administrators outnumbered full-time faculty members in U.S.
higher education beginning in 2006.98 Putting it all in perspective,
Phoenix’s faculty represents a microcosm of the for-profit HEI industry.
And “[Phoenix] faculty, in short, are employees, do not have tenure, and
can be let go, subject to laws that prevent wrongful dismissal. Under
these circumstances, many of the governance issues that absorb time and
91. GARY A. BERG, LESSONS FROM THE EDGE: FOR-PROFIT AND NONTRADITIONAL
HIGHER EDUCATION IN AMERICA 110-11 (Praeger Publishers, 2005) (emphasis
supplied) (quotation omitted).
92. Id. at 111.
93. Id. at 150.
94. See BERG, supra note 91, passim.
95. Roger Brown, The Impact of Markets, in HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE
MARKET, supra note 9, at 43; see also ANDREW J. COULSON, MARKET EDUCATION: THE
UNKNOWN HISTORY, passim (Transaction Publishers, 1999).
96. SLAUGHTER & RHOADES, supra note 9, at 307.
97. Id. at 332 (emphasis added).
98. See, e.g., Scott Jaschik, The Shrinking Professoriate, INSIDE HIGHER EDUC.
(Mar. 12, 2008), http://insidehighered.com/news/2008/03/12/jobs.
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energy in traditional institutions simply are not present” under a private
or for-profit model.99 Phoenix stated, “[w]e believe that the population
we serve is better served by a practitioner faculty.”100
Salaries are the major operating expense of a law school, and senior
faculty salaries have risen well ahead of inflation in the past three
decades. Law professors are paid approximately double the average
of college and university professors generally . . . [and a]s salaries
101
have risen for law professors, teaching loads have gone down . . . .
It is easy to imagine a less academic and more market-driven model
102
of legal education . . . .

For-profit HEIs are all about “outcomes and achieving them.”103
This explains why a marketized, non-tenured law school model makes
sense in a new academically capitalized HEI system, because the most
notable outcome—bar passage and licensure—is an easily measured
outcome.104
Second, for-profit HEI’s “understand better than their nonprofit
competitors, that the education industry is a service industry first and
foremost, and that those who want to survive have to focus on students’
and their prospective employers’ satisfaction105 instead of alternative
priorities such as faculty research,”106 another key piece of the
99.
100.

Breneman, supra note 37, at 85.
Id. at 91. Cf. infra text accompanying note 116 (comparing the use of adjunct
faculty at the University of Kentucky College of Law and the University of
Massachusetts School of Law – Dartmouth).
101. Maimon Schwarzchild, The Ethics and Economics of American Legal
Education Today, 17 J. CONTEMP. L. ISSUES 3, 6, 8 (2008) (indicating also that the
current law school business model depends on students willing to incur debt, whether
the federal government continues to offer loans and subsidies, and whether the A.B.A.
continues its monopoly relative to who can take bar exams across state lines).
102. Id. at 10.
103. BERG, supra note 91, at 111 (quotation omitted).
104. Bar passage information is publically available. See, e.g., Ohio State Bar
Examination Results, THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO & THE OHIO JUDICIAL SYSTEM
(Nov. 3, 2011), http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/AttySvcs/admissions/barresultsrelease/.
105. See, e.g., Legal Education and Professional Development—An Educational
Continuum, Report of the Task Force on Law Schools and the Profession: Narrowing
the Gap, 1992 A.B.A. SEC. LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR (arguing for
more skills and clinical training and commonly referred to as the “MacCrate Report”);
Gary A. Munneke, Legal Skills for a Transforming Profession, 22 PACE L. REV. 105,
130-35 (2001).
106. Andreas Ortmann, Why Wall Street Fell in Love with Higher Education, in
EARNINGS FROM LEARNING, supra note 1, at 150 (emphasis added).
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Langdellian model of legal education.107 In the current higher education
market, non-selective non-profit HEIs offer higher faculty teaching
loads with less academic support, materially contributing to faculty’s
inability to “pursu[e] serious scholarship.”108 Because “[s]cholarly work
is not part of the job [at a for-profit institution,] and the institution of
tenure is inconceivable, [t]his approach would be more threatening to
faculty in traditional colleges and universities . . . but . . . the
connections—and implications—are far from obvious.”109
Third, “colleges and universities have downsized and essentially
outsourced their instructional production workers, replacing full-time
with part-time and contingent faculty. The percentage of faculty who are
part-time has doubled in the last twenty years despite research pointing
to the significance of contact with faculty for student learning,
satisfaction, and success.”110 At Phoenix, for example, inside the
classroom, instructors have little to no academic freedom.111 In fact,
“[c]onsistency in what course material is delivered and in the learning
objectives is more important at the University of Phoenix because of its
lack of full-time permanent faculty, who at traditional universities are
the guardians of the curriculum.”112 Already in the U.S., Britain, and
Australia, an increasing gulf exists between full-time faculty and adjunct
or contingent faculty, creating a two-tier workforce.113
Starting in the 1980s and escalating through the 1990s, the number of parttime and adjunct faculty exploded . . . . That the growth of this contingent
workforce inside the academy paralleled the growing reliance on temporary
and transitory workers in the economy at large114 was just one more sign that
universities were themselves becoming more like enterprises, more able if not
exactly ready to apply the lessons of the larger economy to their own

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

See KIMBALL, supra note 53.
ZEMSKY ET AL., supra note 23, at 54.
Breneman, supra note 37, at 87.
SLAUGHTER & RHOADES, supra note 9, at 332.
See Breneman, supra note 37, passim.
BERG, supra note 91, at 118.
See, e.g., Brown, supra note 9, at 6 (citations omitted).
See ZEMSKY ET AL., supra note 23, at 27 and accompanying text (discussing
A.B.A. potentially removing tenure as accreditation requirement).
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operations. The net result was that faculty . . . were becoming a smaller
minority in the institutions they once dominated.115

For example, as of July 2011, the faculty ratio at the University of
Kentucky’s College of Law is about 2:1 tenure-track to adjunct faculty,
while the faculty at the University of Massachusetts School of Law Dartmouth, a recent law school subject to M&A activity, has a faculty
composition nearly the opposite, 2:1 outsourced faculty to tenure-track
faculty.116
Having articulated the basic relationship between the A.B.A.,
AAUP, tenure, academic freedom, and scholarly requirements, to
faculty composition and CFLSs generally within a marketized HEI
landscape, Part II of this Article will detail how these pieces and players
fit within the general HEI business model.
II. MARKETIZED HEIS:
HISTORY, REVENUE GENERATION, AND STRATEGIC BUSINESS MODELS
Higher education accounts for approximately $225 billion in annual
expenditures,117 and marketization in higher education “is a rapidly
growing phenomenon.”118 Indeed, in 1999, the education industry119 was
the second largest industry in the U.S. behind health care.120 Yet that
115.

See ZEMSKY ET AL., supra note 23, at 27-28; see also Brown, supra note 95, at

28.
116. See Adjunct & Visiting Faculty, UNIV. OF KENTUCKY COLLEGE OF LAW,
http://www.law.uky.edu/index.php?pid=165 (last visited July 30, 2011); Faculty
Directory, UNIV. OF KENTUCKY COLLEGE OF LAW, http://www.law.uky.edu/index.php
?pid=80 (last visited July 30, 2011).
117. ZEMSKY, ET AL., supra note 23, at 123.
118. BROWN, Introduction to HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE MARKET 2.
119. See Occupational Safety & Health Administration: Industry Group 8221
Colleges, Universities and Professional Schools, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR,
http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/sic_manual.display?id=69&tab=group (last visited July
30, 2011) (evidencing education’s position as a recognized industry participant is the
United States Department of Labor Standard Industrial Classification (“SIC”) Code
8221 “Colleges, Universities and Professional Schools,” which both the SEC and
investment professionals continue to apply when identifying economic industries in the
U.S.); see also SEC Division of Corporation Finance: Standard Industrial
Classification (SIC) Code List, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/info/edgar/siccodes.htm (last
visited July 30, 2011).
120. =Ortmann, supra note 106, at 146 (stating that health care interestingly went
through its own privatization and M&A activity during the 1980s that “many consider a
template of things to come in the education industry”).

412

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XVII

year, fewer than ten Wall Street analysts covered the education sector,121
evidencing its position in a highly fragmented, illiquid, and inefficient
marketplace.122 While between 15-23 analysts cover the sector today,123
higher education still fails to meet the neo-classical economic
assumptions,124 and education Professor Brian Pusser asserted that “[f]or
at least three decades, economists have pointed to difficulties in
attempting to apply market models to higher education.”125
For example, “higher education does not meet the conditions of a
perfect market [because] . . . a key condition of the perfectly competitive
market is that producers, consumers, and resource owners must possess
perfect knowledge126,” and asymmetrical knowledge exists in the
education industry. Some scholars indicate that “imperfect consumer
knowledge may derive from college and university marketing efforts
that are aimed at influencing consumer choices . . . .” and another
“condition of the perfectly competitive market, the homogeneity of
products,” also does not apply, as “all college educations are not the
same.”127 Perhaps underscoring the dirigiste nature of all capitalist
economies failing to meet neoclassical economic models because of a
lack of perfect information, “the perfectly informed customer of
economic theory,” also, “is nowhere to be seen.”128
121.
122.

Ortmann, supra note 106, at 146.
See, e.g., John Krainer & Stephen F. LeRoy, Equilibrium Valuation of Illiquid
Assets, 19 J. OF ECON. 223 (2002).
123. Apollo Group Inc. (APOL) Analyst Opinion, YAHOO FINANCE,
http://finance.yahoo.com/q/ao?s=APOL+Analyst+Opinion (last visited July 30, 2011);
Corinthian Colleges Inc. (COCO) Analyst Opinion, YAHOO FINANCE,
http://finance.yahoo.com/q/ao?s=COCO+Analyst+Opinion (last visited July 30, 2011);
EDMC Analyst Opinion, YAHOO FINANCE, http://finance.yahoo.com/q/ao?s=EDMC+
Analyst+Opinion (last visited July 30, 2011).
124. See, e.g., Terry M. Moe, The New Economics of Organization, 28:4 AM. J. OF
POL. SCI. 739 (1984).
125. Brian Pusser, Higher Education, Markets, and the Preservation of the Public
Good, in EARNINGS FROM LEARNING, supra note 1, at 31.
126. SLAUGHTER & RHOADES, supra note 9, at 284 (citations omitted).
127. See id. at 284. Buttressing the importance of HEI marketing, Professor Richard
Chait wrote an article in the Chronicle of Higher Education entitled, The Growing
Hucksterism of College Admissions, stating that “[o]ver the past twenty years, college
admissions have shifted from essentially a selection function to a marketing function.”
Id. at 287.
128. FRANK NEWMAN ET AL., THE FUTURE OF HIGHER EDUCATION: RHETORIC,
REALITY, AND THE RISKS OF THE MARKET 91 (Jossey-Bass, 2004) (internal citations
omitted).
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Underscoring the developing marketization and informational
asymmetries inherent in the HEI industry, the academic literature on
postsecondary organizations contains “little, if any, consideration of
subunits and groups within the organization, or of their multiple
connections with various units and groups outside the organizations.”129
In particular, little research exists relative to law schools’ financing,
organizational architectures, and reorganizations in the recent
marketized HEI economy. Regardless, HEIs remains fragmented130 and
inefficient. As a result, this Part attempts to use law school data when
possible, but when unable to do so employs broader HEI data.
A. HIGHER EDUCATION’S EXTENSIVE EXISTENCE AS A COMMERCIAL
ENTERPRISE
Historian Stanley Chodorow stated,
By the middle of the twelfth century, there were dozens of teachers
and thousands of students [in Paris], and, by the 1180s, it appears,
the teaching masters there had formed the guild—the universitas—
that would be the seed of the modern university. The university was
a craft guild, with the form and functions of all other craft guilds,
[that] . . . organized and regulated the business of the teaching
masters in the city. The guild was a collective entity, the very
definition of a corporation. The teaching masters who belonged to
the university made and sold knowledge. They made knowledge by
applying logical analysis to the classic texts in grammar, philosophy,
131
theology, medicine, and law.

Moreover, “well into the nineteenth century, proprietary [private,
for-profit] education was a source of training for professional
occupations in areas such as . . . law.”132 As recently as the mid-1990s,
Federal District Court Judge Louis C. Bechtle described the commercial
nature of education, stating,
That MIT is a significant commercial entity is beyond peradventure.
The magnitude of MIT’s economic activity is certainly far greater
than that of the vast majority of businesses. MIT has an operating

129.
130.
131.
132.

SLAUGHTER & RHOADES, supra note 9, at 8-9.
EDMC 10-K, supra note 3, at 7.
ZEMSKY ET AL., supra note 23, at 49-50.
Sarah E. Turner, For Profit Colleges in the Context of the Market for Higher
Education, in EARNINGS FROM LEARNING, supra note 1, at 51 (emphasis added)
(internal citations omitted).
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budget of approximately $1.1 billion and an endowment of $1.5
billion. MIT’s annual revenues from tuition, room and board charges
are approximately $200 million.
MIT provides educational services to its students, for which they pay
significant sums of money. The exchange of money for services is
“‘commerce’ in the most common usage of that word.” By agreeing
upon aid applicants’ families’ expected financial contribution, the
Ivy Overlap Group schools were setting the price aid applicants and
their families would pay for educational services. The court can
conceive of few aspects of higher education that are more
133
commercial than the price charged to students.

And despite recently increased M&A activity with law schools,134
Professor Walter P. Metzger asserted in 1982 that
A merger is not an extraordinary event: the absorption of one college
or university by another . . . has been going on since the founding of
the Republic. A good many of our private college began by taking
over private academies; a good many of our state universities began
by swallowing up private colleges. Dozens of medical schools in this
country were impelled to trade their separate existences for . . .
profitable association with universities; innumerable law schools . . .
135
were moved to do the same.

Therefore, HEIs—including law schools—historically have
maintained commercial roles as industrial players, from revenue
generators to M&A participants, within western and U.S. economies.
Erudition of the financing and business strategies that underpin HEIs’

133. United States v. Brown Univ., 805 F. Supp. 288, 298 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (quoting
Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 787-88 (1975)) (emphasis added), rev’d, 5
F.3d 658, 668 (3d Cir. 1993) (forcing the lower court to apply social welfare
justifications). The Third Circuit nonetheless “agreed with the district court in holding
that the gratuitous offering of financial assistance to incoming students was a
‘commercial transaction,’ not a charitable act, and thus within the purview of the
Sherman Act.” Theodore J. Stachtiaris, Note, Antitrust in Need: Undergraduate
Financial Aid and the United States v. Brown University, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1745,
1748 (1994) (emphasis added). The case involved the Justice Department charging the
eight Ivy League schools (Brown, Columbia, Cornell, Dartmouth, Harvard, Princeton,
Yale, and University of Pennsylvania) which settled, and MIT, which chose to litigate,
with antitrust violations. Brown Univ., 805 F. Supp. at 289.
134. See supra notes 18, 33, 34.
135. Metzger, supra note 26, at 4a (emphasis added).
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commercial and industrial positioning is crucial to understanding this
Article’s articulated dilemma, as well as proposed solution.
B. EXPANDING MARKETIZED HIGHER EDUCATION
1. Development of Today’s Marketized HEI Environment via Portable
Revenue Sources
Following the Second World War’s conclusion in the late 1940s,
Congress enacted the GI Bill.136 The GI Bill permitted military veterans
to obtain federal financial assistance to attend the vocational, nonvocational, non-profit, or proprietary post-secondary educational
institutions of their choosing.137 A generation later, part of President
Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society programs included the Higher
Education Act of 1965 (“HEA”).138 Similar to the GI Bill, Title IV of
HEA (“Title IV”) permitted individual student portability of federal
financial aid.139 Congress’ reauthorization of the HEA in 1972
authorized what later became known as “Pell Grants”—aid directly to
students who could choose to use the funds at an accredited institution,
rather than providing the federal financial assistance directly to
institutions that could use the funds on behalf of students.140 During
1972’s reauthorization of the Higher Education Act, Congress made
proprietary schools eligible for Title IV federal financial aid.141
“The neoliberal state began to turn students into consumers as early
as 1972, when Congress shifted higher education funding from
institutions to students. Combined with rising tuition, the shift from

136. Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-346, 58 Stat. 587
(codified at 38 U.S.C. § 101) [hereinafter, G.I. Bill].
137. Id.
138. Higher Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-329, tit. IV, 1219 (codified as
amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1070-109) [hereinafter, HEA].
139. See, e.g., Brian Pusser & David A. Wolcott, A Crowded Lobby: Non-Profit and
For-Profit Universities and the Emerging Politics of Higher Education, in EARNINGS
FROM LEARNING, supra note 1, 170.
140. Id. at 171. During this time, however, states largely directed (albeit dwindling)
financial support to institutions, not individuals. Id. at 170. The shift from grants to
loans has transferred the payment burden to the consumer. SLAUGHTER & RHOADES,
supra note 9, at 37 (internal citations omitted).
141. See Turner, supra note 132, at 55.
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grants to loans over the course of the past thirty years has confirmed
142
students’ identity as consumers of higher education.”

Therefore, unsurprisingly, “[s]ince 1972, federal student financial
aid in grant form diminished relative to the cost of higher education,
while the supply of loan money expanded rapidly.”143
While federal and state governments have failed to create a
meaningful yet constitutional voucher system at the K-12 level,144
subsidized student loans have done so at the higher education level.145
Unlike the fight over vouchers and charter schools to generate student
choice at the K-12 level, since 1972, consumer choice, via loan
portability, has driven the HEI marketplace.146 The A.B.A. lost its battle

142.
143.
144.

SLAUGHTER & RHOADES, supra note 9, at 22.
Id. at 42.
Cf. Zelman v. Simons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (5-4 decision containing an
unusually high six opinions and holding that Ohio’s voucher program did not violate
the establishment clause of the First Amendment to the U.S. constitution); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 3313.978(A) (LexisNexis 2006) (articulating Ohio’s voucher
requirements for K-12 students).
145. ZEMSKY, ET AL., supra note 23, at 164.
146. Mirroring, however, some concerns of opponents of school choice in K-12
education, certain disturbing statistics exist regarding post-secondary student loans. See
Brown, supra note 95, at 31-34, 47 (quoting WALTER P. HELLER & DAVID A.
STARRETT, On the Nature of Externalities, in THEORY AND MEASUREMENT OF
ECONOMIC EXTERNALITIES 37 (Steven A.Y. Lin ed., 1976) (stating that for those at the
20th percentile in 2003, the proportion of income required to pay public university
tuition in 1967 shifted to 30 percent in 2003 but for the families in the 95th percentile,
the percentage of income grew from 2 to 3.5 percent. A so-called “distributional
inequality” exists in this funding scheme that favors middle class students to the
detriment of lower class students); see also Brown, supra note 9, at 14-15 (internal
citations omitted); Eckel & Morphew, supra note 16, at 91 (internal citations omitted).
However, nonprofits’ use of portable aid served to benefit those with the greatest ability
to repay their loans, leading to further social stratification, benefitting the well-off.

However, for-profits’ targeted niche (and creatively financed law schools’ unique
silo able to target a niche [centers, certificate programs, etc.]) can help level the
playing field. EDMC’s law school student body is consistently among the most
diverse in the nation in terms of culture, ethnicity, socio-economic background, and
number of first-time college graduates/law school graduates, with its two most
recent first-time bar pass rates (the measure for the for-profit/vocational model)
being over 75 percent. Moreover, driving consumer choice—and thus the precious
Title IV dollars needed to generate HEIs’ revenues—are “outside organizations like
USNews and World Report rat[ing] college and university performance, judging their
worth to the student/parent consumer.” SLAUGHTER & RHOADES, supra note 9, at 23.
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against for-profit schools when a federal trial court ordered the A.B.A.
“enjoined and restrained from . . . adopting or enforcing any Standard,
Interpretation, or Rule, or taking any action that has the purpose or
effect of prohibiting a law school from . . . being an institution organized
as a for-profit entity.”147 Following the A.B.A.’s failed attempt to
prevent for-profit accredited law schools in 1996, both the 1997
Taxpayer Relief Act and the 1998 Higher Education Act contained
provisions benefitting consumer choice at for-profit HEIs.148
Simultaneously, state HEI financing shifted from “appropriations to
tuition revenues in a conscious commitment to high-tuition, high-aid
policies” that “give an increasing share of monies to students through
financial aid and to decrease the share given directly to higher education
institutions.”149 Doane and Pusser indicated that “[t]o date, there has
been little empirical investigation of the effect of entrepreneurial
revenue generation close to the academic core.”150 As a result, while
better market-based solutions may exist—such as income-contingent
loans,151 in which private investors loan funds to students or obtain
147. United States v. A.B.A., 934 F. Supp. 435, 436 (D.D.C. 1996) (modified Final
Judgment at 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2279). In addition, the
[P]rimary reason American legal education so effectively entrenches the wealthy and
denies access to the non-wealthy is that it operates as a rent-seeking cartel which in its
essential aspects acts just like other industry cartels that use governmental restrictions
on market entry in order to boost their members’ profits . . . [and t]he lynch-pin of the
cartel is, of course, ABA accreditation.

Elson, supra note 69, at 270 (referencing Robert D. Goldstein, Reading Casey:
Structuring the Woman’s Decisionmaking Process, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 787,
860-64 (1996); Jane Byeff Korn, Collective Rights and Individual Remedies:
Rebalancing the Balance after Lingel v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., 41
HASTINGS L.J. 1149, 1298 (1990)).
148. See SLAUGHTER & RHOADES, supra note 9, at 44.
149. Id. at 283 (internal citations omitted).
150. Dudley J. Doane & Brian Pusser, Profit Centers in Service to Academic Core,
in EARNINGS FROM LEARNING, supra note 1, at 95.
151. See, e.g., Melody, Selling Your Personal Equity: $300K Now For 3% of Your
Lifetime Income, TRANSCAPITALIST (Jan. 18, 2010), http://www.transcapitalist.com
/transcapitalist/2010/1/18/selling-your-personal-equity-300k-now-for-3-of-yourlifetime.html (describing three high-achieving young people who sold a percentage of
their expected future earnings in exchange for a present value ascribed to their future
earnings based on various risk-adjusted discount rates); David A. Moss, College Access
for All: Promoting Investment in Education Through Income-Contingent Lending, THE
TOBIN PROJECT (May 2007), available at http://www.tobinproject.org/downloads
/RP_College_Access_for_All.pdf (indicating the idea “included both Milton Friedman
and James Tobin, two Nobel laureates from opposite ends of the political spectrum.”);
Pamela Sud, Buying Equity in a First Grader?, METHOD LOGICAL (Feb. 24, 2011),
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“equity stakes” in the future earnings of students with whom they invest
funds—the current policy represents “an educated roll of the dice that
the students who receive federal loan dollars will use them to better
themselves and their communities.”152
However, the schools that receive these federal loan dollars use the
funds for revenue growth. For example, between October 1999 and
October 2009, EDMC achieved a compounded annual enrollment
growth rate (“CAEGR”) of 18.9 percent, and the company’s average
enrollment growth during fiscal year 2010 was 22.5 percent, year-overyear.153 EDMC explicitly states that “[f]or-profit providers have
captured an increasing share of the growing demand for post-secondary
education over the last several years . . . [because] non-profit public and
private institutions can face limited financial capability . . . due to a
combination of state funding challenges, significant expenditures
required for research, and the professor tenure system.”154 Of EDMC’s
13,400 full-time employees, approximately 3,000 were (non-tenuretrack) faculty members (roughly twenty-two percent of the workforce),
and EDMC also employed 6,800 adjunct faculty members—an adjunctto-full-time non-tenure-track multiple of approximately 2.25x.155 Thus,
scholarly output and faculty tenure explicitly undermine a marketized
HEI business model built on revenue growth and reduction of the largest
cost centers, even if those cost centers drive academic reputation and
prestige.
http://methodlogical.wordpress.com/2011/02/24/buying-equity-in-a-first-grader/
(describing the author’s exploration of impact investing for social returns at the Harvard
Kennedy School).
152. Nicholas R. Johnson, Phoenix Rising: Default Rates at Proprietary Institutions
of Higher Education and What Can Be Done to Reduce Them, 40 J.L. & EDUC. 225,
271 (2011).
153. EDMC 10-K, supra note 3, at 5.
154. Id. at 7 (emphasis added).
155. Id. at 33. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 189-190 (regarding the similar
role of part-time practitioner faculty in the Phoenix business model). See also David
Hricik, Life in Dark Waters: A Survey of Ethical Malpractice Issues Confronting
Adjunct Law Professors, 42 S. TEX. L. REV. 379 (2001) (stating that “current [ABA]
accreditation standards encourage law schools to ‘include experienced practicing
lawyers and judges as teaching resources to enrich the educational program.’ Adjuncts
play many roles in law schools, and their roles are expanding . . . . Half of all law
professors are adjuncts.”) (internal citations omitted). For the opacity involved in
determining how adjunctified a law school’s faculty may become, see Standards for
Approval of Law Schools, 2007-2008 A.B.A., Standard 402 and Interpretations 402-1-2.
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The marketized HEI business model is as reliant on Title IV funds
as one could imagine. For instance, in fiscal year 2010, over eighty-nine
percent of EDMC’s net revenues came from Title IV sources.156
Education Department rules mandate that at least ten percent of forprofits’ revenues come from sources other than Title IV.157 Under the
so-called “90/10 Rule,” an HEI may lose future Title IV eligibility if, for
two consecutive fiscal years, more than 90 percent of an HEI’s revenue
comes from Title IV sources.158 As a microcosm of the broader HEI
industry, therefore, EDMC is ensuring that it extracts as much as it can
from Title IV sources. While non-Title IV funding represents little more
than ten percent of EDMC’s revenues, public universities that contain
law schools, including the University of Colorado and Penn State
University, “receive less than 10% of their overall funding from state
appropriations for full-time enrollments,”159 thus subjecting them to new
funding models in a marketized academic landscape.
Briefly re-focusing the discussion from the revenue side to the cost
side, according to an article in The Chronicle of Higher Education, forprofit HEIs “devote 20 percent of their operating budgets to marketing”
and activities related to driving revenues, while the figure for non-

156.
157.
158.

EDMC 10-K, supra note 3, at 22.
SLAUGHTER & RHOADES, supra note 9, at 45.
EDMC 10-K, supra note 3, at 29. Beyond the 90/10 Rule, Secretary of
Education Arne Duncan explicitly has targeted for-profit HEIs. For example,
[P]reviously, DOE had vaguely framed its proposed regulations in terms of
‘protecting the integrity of Title IV loan programs,’ but a statement issued by
Education Secretary Arne Duncan noted that the for-profit sector’s rapid enrollment
growth, debt loads, and default rates ‘prompted’ the latest changes to the law [which
dealt with incentive compensation and job placement, as well as graduation rates].

Johnson, supra note 152, at 257. Some of Secretary Duncan’s strategies regarding forprofit HEIs raise questions with a number of legal scholars, including Judge Posner of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. See, e.g., Richard Posner,
The Controversy over For-Profit Colleges, BECKER-POSNER BLOG (June 20, 2010),
http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/2010/06/the-controversy-over-forprofitcollegesposner.html. In addition, other arms of the federal government have taken aim
at for-profit HEIs. See, e.g., Neal McCluskey, GAO Confirms: It Did Nothing Wrong,
and It’s None of Your Business, CATO@LIBERTY (Feb. 8, 2011), http://www.cato-atliberty.org/gao-confirms-it-did-nothing-wrong-and-its-none-of-your-business/
(
”According to its own investigation, [the Government Accountability Office found]
errors were made in producing a report highly damaging to for-profit colleges, but no
one had any bad intentions and the report still stands.”).
159. Mark Stater, Policy Lessons from the Privatization of Public Agencies, in
PRIVATIZING THE PUBLIC UNIVERSITY, supra note 9, at 134.
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profits is five percent, which is seventy-five percent lower.160 However,
a material cost advantage for privately funded for-profit schools
includes the inefficiencies inherent in public and private non-profits.161
Typically, the term “inefficient” has been used to refer “to faculty
paying too much attention to their research instead of teaching.”162 One
scholar indicated that he had “little doubt that the ability of for-profits to
emerge, and thrive, in what should be a hostile environment to them . . .
only because of the appalling inefficiency . . . of traditional providers of
postsecondary education.”163 However, in the face of these traditional
schools’ inefficiencies, significant changes appear to be occurring
within traditional HEIs that begin to blur some historical lines in a
marketized environment.
2. Marketization Forces Change Among Even Traditional HEIs
Despite many ostensible and longstanding differences between
traditionally financed and creatively financed HEIs, they both are
moving toward a marketized model. Unlike CFLSs, traditional
universities receive “commercial revenue, tax revenue, and
donations.”164 In addition, research schools can generate additional
funding by taking equity stakes in inventions or intellectual property, or
by licensing that intellectual property and receiving a royalty stream in
return.165 Traditional HEIs also can generate revenues through extension
programs,166 real estate foundations, endowment offices, and patent
offices.
160. Brown, supra note 95, at 43 (quoting E. Strout, Breaking Through the Noise of
a Crowded Field, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., May 19, 2006).
161. Id.
162. Ortmann, supra note 106, at 151. Two types of relevant efficiencies exist in
this context. First, “static efficiency” represents “the ratio of outputs to inputs at any
one point in time.” Second, “dynamic efficiency” means “sustaining a higher rate of
growth over time through product and process innovation and better management of
resources.” Brown, supra note 9, at 6-7.
163. Ortmann, supra note 106, at 151 (emphasis added).
164. Pusser, supra note 125, at 32.
165. SLAUGHTER & RHOADES, supra note 9, at 252; see also LAWRENCE C. SOLELY,
LEASING THE IVORY TOWER: THE CORPORATE TAKEOVER OF ACADEMIA (South End
Press 1995) (stating that corporations are, in effect, taking over traditional academia);
NORMAN E. BOWIE, UNIVERSITY-BUSINESS PARTNERSHIPS: AN ASSESSMENT (Rowman
& Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 1994).
166. See Doane & Pusser, supra note 150, at 94.
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However, a traditional non-profit HEI can only raise equity capital
if it works collaboratively with a for-profit entity or creates a for-profit
subsidiary.167 Recent research
now point[s] to the internal embeddedness of profit-oriented
activities as a point of reorganization (and new investment) by
higher education institutions to develop their own capacity (and to
hire new types of professionals) to market products created by
faculty and develop commercializable products outside of (though
connected to) conventional academic structures and individual
168
faculty members.

For example, “the rise of ‘wholly owned subsidiaries’ is not
uncommon . . . Colorado State University, University of North Carolina,
and the University of Illinois have each created spin-offs169 to . . .
generate revenue for their ‘parent companies.’”170 Moreover,
“privatization emerged as a major focus and a deep concern of many
leading analysts and observers of public higher education at the turn of
the twenty-first century.”171 Nonetheless, even in the arena of publicly
traded companies, few individuals understand such reorganizations and

167.
168.
169.

Breneman et al., supra note 17, at 10 (internal citations omitted).
SLAUGHTER & RHOADES, supra note 9, at 11.
Spin-offs constitute one flavor of corporate reorganizations and restructurings.
For Harvard Business School Professor Stuart Gilson’s detailed contextualization of
spin-offs, including basic tax treatments, see STUART C. GILSON, CREATING VALUE
THROUGH CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING: CASE STUDIES IN BANKRUPTCIES, BUYOUTS,
AND BREAKUPS 9-10 (John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 2001). Other types of reorganizations
and restructurings include split-offs, carve-outs, share repurchases, tracking stock
issuances, and leveraged buyouts (“LBOs”). Id. at 1-6. From 1980 through 2001, over
1,500 corporations reorganized via equity spin-offs, split-offs, and carveouts, alone. Id.
at 1-2. As a result, UNC’s and Illinois’ spinoffs represent academic capitalism
following the lead of the market’s capitalism. See also JAMES E. MORRIS, ACCOUNTING
FOR M&A, EQUITY, AND CREDIT ANALYSIS (McGraw-Hill 2004).
170. Eckel & Morphew, supra note 16, at 91 (internal citations omitted).
171. Michael K. McLendon & Christine G. Mokher, The Origins and Growth of
State Policies that Privatize Public Higher Education, in PRIVATIZING THE PUBLIC
UNIVERSITY, supra note 9, at 7 (internal citations omitted). McLendon and Mokher also
identify five privatizing trends in state policy relative to higher education: (1) declining
state funding; (2) deregulation of tuition setting authority; (3) expansion of prepaid
tuition and tax-favored college savings programs; (4) the creation of state merit
aid/scholarship programs, for example, in Kentucky, Tennessee, West Virginia, Florida,
Georgia, Louisiana, Michigan, Missouri, Nevada, and South Carolina, that permit
students to apply the aid to private tuition charges; and (5) decentralization of
governance. Id. at 11, 18 (internal citations omitted).
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restructurings.172 When discussing the “extent to which and the rapidity
with which public universities are becoming ‘privatized,’ . . . institutions
must compete vigorously in the economic marketplace . . . and are
viewed by policymakers and university leaders alike as quasi-state
agencies, if state related at all.”173
Therefore, “in principle, the nonprofit calculus is no different from
that underlying the incentive in the for-profit sector to boost shareholder
value.”174 Indications exist of non-profits acting as for-profits. For
example, “[m]anagers and board members . . . set long-term shareholder
value creation as their primary objective,”175 while “‘nonprofits
maximize profits and distribute them in disguised form (as higher wages
and perks), or they may maximize revenues that lead to power and
prestige for their managers.’”176 Moreover, the “CEO of a for-profit
enterprise, educational or otherwise,” has a “mission . . . to maximize
shareholder value.”177 The CEOs of traditional HEIs (university
presidents), in fact, work within compensation structures similar to
private, for-profit HEIs,
both of which are closer to the general structure of pay for CEOs in
the corporate world than to the structure of pay in most public
organizations. When public and nonprofit universities adopt
compensation packages that are structured like those of the private
sector, they become more committed to an academic capitalist
178
knowledge/learning regime.

172. GILSON, supra note 169, at vii, xvi, 3-4 (stating that “[d]espite the expanding
impact and reach of corporate restructuring, however, much of what transpires in a
restructuring is typically hidden from public view. As a result, many of those directly
affected by a restructuring—managers, directors, employees, and investors—may have
little in the way of experience or training to prepare them for the critical . . . challenges
they will face . . . . [M]uch of what has been written about corporate restructuring is
based on publicly known facts and data . . . [and] most of what transpires inside these
companies is still a black box.”).
173. Preface to PRIVATIZING THE PUBLIC UNIVERSITY, supra note 9, at vii-x.
174. ZEMSKY, ET AL., supra note 23, at 67.
175. KOLLER ET AL., supra note 2, at 4.
176. SLAUGHTER & RHOADES, supra note 9, at 334 (quoting E. James,
Commercialism Among Nonprofits: Objectives, Opportunities, and Constraints, in TO
PROFIT OR NOT TO PROFIT: THE COMMERCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE NONPROFIT
SECTOR 273 (B.A. Weisbrod ed., 1998)).
177. ROBERT ZEMSKY, ET AL., supra note 23, at 63.
178. SLAUGHTER & RHOADES, supra note 9, at 251-52 (emphasis added).
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As a result, “academic capitalism179 blurs the boundaries between
public and private sectors.”180 Therefore, “the not-for-profit model looks
like the for-profit model, but mission attainment is substituted for
profit.”181 “In reality, very little of what the for-profits do hasn’t been
done in some way by traditional institutions.”182
3. The Marketized HEI’s Strategic Business Model: Deliver Measurable
Outcomes Without Academic Freedom, Tenure, and Faculty
Governance
An argument exists that part of the transformation in HEIs, even at
the undergraduate level, is shifting to produce skills-based graduates.
For instance, because “[c]orporations need well-educated workers in
business related areas” such as “law—to create and protect knowledgebased products, processes, and services,” business has become the core
curricula of undergraduate HEIs; simply put, “the majority of all courses
taken in four-year schools are in business fields.”183
For-profit schools focus on vocational skill development because
the skills taught are easy to quantify and verify via certification;
practitioners can replace research scholars as instructors, and modest
property, plant, and equipment requirements exist for such schools.184
This scenario sounds eerily like a law school. Just taking one example of
a CFLS, Michigan State University College of Law describes itself as “a
private institution of higher learning exclusively devoted to professional
education in law.”185 Amplifying HEIs’ general shift to skills that
correspond with measurable outcomes—such as passing the bar exam
and job placement figures, is increasing investigatory pressure by the
federal government, which is threatening to pull Title IV funding from
179. Professors Slaughter and Rhoades stated that:
Academic capitalism in the new economy sees groups of actors within colleges and
universities—faculty, students, administrators, and managerial professionals—as
using a variety of state resources to intersect the new economy . . . . Their individual
decisions to engage in organized activities that promote market and marketlike
activities consolidate the academic capitalist knowledge/learning regime.

Id. at 306.
180. Id. at 329.
181. ZEMSKY, ET AL., supra note 23, at 59.
182. BERG, supra note 91, at 169.
183. SLAUGHTER & RHOADES, supra note 9, at 19.
184. Turner, supra note 132, at 58-59.
185. See, e.g., History of Michigan State University College of Law, available at
http://www.law.msu.edu/history.html (last visited July 20, 2011) (emphasis added).
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certain schools based on default rates, gainful employment numbers, and
other questionably drafted agency rules.186
To deliver these measurable outcomes, marketized HEIs, such as
Phoenix, remain in the dark not because of the revenue side but because
of cost side decisions187 that impact tenure, academic freedom, and
faculty governance. Concerning faculty governance, marketized HEIs
believe “that academics are not qualified to make management decisions
for the organization, and that the institution is better off if managers
control nonacademic areas.”188 Regarding tenure, Phoenix employs a
business model that relies heavily on part-time practitioner-instructors,
not academic faculty.189 For example, in 2004, Phoenix retained 18,000
part-time instructors, with 1,400 full-time faculty, none of whom were
tenured or tenure-track,190 because “the basic explanation for
[Phoenix’s] profitability is to be found in these figures.”191 Marketized
HEI economics push certain of Phoenix’s decisions vis-à-vis academic
freedom. For instance, Phoenix drives economies of scale by requiring
instructors to teach from established and uniform syllabi, textbooks, and
learning materials, not only permitting Phoenix to leverage purchasing
186. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 152, passim. To remain eligible for Title IV
funding, a proprietary school (why the distinction even exists deserves scrutiny, given
the other similarities between for-profits and non-profits, discussed supra text
accompanying notes 174-182) must pass either the loan repayment rate test or a debt-toincome test. Program Integrity: Gainful Employment, 75 Fed. Reg. 43616, 4361643620 (proposed July 26, 2010) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. § 668); see also United
States ex. rel Hendow v. Univ. of Phoenix, 461 F.3d 1166, 1168 (9th Cir. 2006), which
included assertions under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2) (2006). The
myopic view of the Department of Education, however, fails to review the total mix of
a student’s debt portfolio. Students are financially incentivized to default on
dischargeable and higher-interest consumer credit card debt, for example, rather than
lower-interest, non-dischargeable student loan debt, but no reason exists as to why an
HEI should be penalized if some students make choices that appear contrary to their
economic interests, except for the federal government wanting to reiterate its
superiority position.
187. See Breneman, supra note 37, at 79.
188. BERG, supra note 91, at 195; see also infra Part IV (evidencing EDMC’s
embrace of this model as well).
189. Breneman, supra note 37, at 72; cf. EDMC’s faculty composition, infra Part
III.
190. Id. at 72-73, 77.
191. Id. at 73. Part-time faculty made approximately $1,000-$1,600 per course,
which had twenty-four hours of faculty contact with students, and interviews with more
than twenty Phoenix faculty indicated that “few ‘do it for the money.’” Id. at 76.
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power with book publishers,192 but also stripping instructors of all but
the faintest bit of academic freedom in the classroom. Granularizing this
general view of marketized HEIs’ approaches toward academic freedom
is the argument that a traditional law school model assumed the “notion
that legal scholarship is worth the increased . which substantially funds
its production [and] not only lacks any empirical support, it cannot
withstand the test of common sense . . . .”193 Beyond following creative
market models on the revenue side, traditional HEIs also have begun to
follow some of these marketized models on the cost side in ways that
impact tenure, faculty governance, and academic freedom. As
Professors Slaughter and Rhodes stated, “the neoliberal state has
reinterpreted labor law to increase workplace flexibility . . . that allow[s]
. . . universities to . . . alter[] accreditation practices [and] . . . accept
hiring practices that decenter full-time faculty – the states affirm lack of
faculty involvement in shared governance . . . .”194 Part II-C, infra,
highlights several examples of the impact the marketized HEI business
model has had on traditional state-run HEIs.
C. REORGANIZING THE PUBLIC LAW SCHOOL AND UNIVERSITY TO FIT A
MARKETIZED MODEL
In the 1970s, the University of Michigan (“Michigan”) and the
University of California Berkeley (“UC Berkeley”) generated
substantially similar revenues.195 But Michigan strategically moved in a
marketized direction in the 1980s to a point in which people began
referring to the school as “The University of Michigan, Inc.,”196 and by
moving towards a revenue-growth business model away from direct
government dependency, Michigan’s annual revenues exceeded UC
Berkeley’s by over $400 million.197 When one of UC Berkeley’s
professional schools—its business school—ultimately switched to a
creative financing model by privatizing at the turn of the millennium,
tuition unsurprisingly skyrocketed, raising UC Berkeley’s MBA
program’s tuition by greater than 301 percent over the ensuing
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

Id. at 77, 82.
Elson, supra note 69, at 276.
SLAUGHTER & RHOADES, supra note 9, at 21-22 (emphasis added).
ZEMSKY ET AL., supra note 23, passim.
ZEMSKY, ET AL., supra note 23, at 8. As an Ohio State alumnus, however, I
continue to refer to the University of Michigan by a variety of other names,
inappropriate for placement within legal scholarship.
197. Id. at 8.
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decade.198 Compared to UC Berkeley, however, the always privatelyfinanced Stanford MBA program’s tuition—located in the same general
geographic area and tier of US News rankings—rose by a significantly
lower 72.5 percent over the same time period.199 Dean Judy Olian of
UCLA’s Anderson School of Business has stated that her goal is to
wholly eliminate state support, because doing so would provide, inter
alia, flexibility regarding revenue generators such as tuition and fees and
expense centers such as faculty compensation.200 The dean of UC Davis’
business school has similar plans to privatize the school to enable more
similarly centralized decision-making regarding the schools’ revenues
and expenses.201
In the law school context, the University of Virginia’s School of
Law embraced a creative and marketized private funding model in
2005;202 and as the University of Minnesota Law School ponders going
wholly private in 2011, state funding will comprise fewer than ten
percent of the school’s budget in 2011-2012.203 As a growing number of
once public law schools currently scramble to engineer inventive
financial or organizational restructurings to address state funding crises,
and because the ABA is tight-lipped about releasing law schools’
financial data (even for scholarly research purposes),204 understanding
the private, for-profit educational model provides potential guidance as
to what may occur within law schools.

198. John A. Byrne, The Privatization of California’s B-Schools, POETS & QUANTS,
http://poetsandquants.com/2011/06/22/the-privatization-of-californias-b-schools/ (last
visited July 30, 2011).
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. See id.
202. See Dolph C. Simmons, Jr., State Funding Cuts Spur Universities to Ponder
Privatization, LJWORLD.COM (July 9, 2011), http://www2.ljworld.com/news/2011/jul
/09/state-funding-cuts-spur-universities-ponder-privat/?print.
203. Id.; see also supra text accompanying note 159 (evidencing several instances of
state funding at or below the ten percent threshold at Penn State University and the
University of Colorado, both of which house law schools).
204. E-mail from Kenneth R. Williams, ABA Data Specialist, to Western State
College of Law Associate Dean of Academic Affairs Susan Keller (June 24, 2011) (on
file with author) (stating that law schools’ financial reports are “intended for exclusive
and official use by those persons authorized by the Council to receive it” in response to
Keller’s e-mail indicating that a faculty member wanted to use this information for
research purposes).
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Even within the world of for-profits, many of whom publish
financial disclosures with the SEC, “[t]he basic demographics of the forprofit sector of the higher education market are not well documented.”205
As University of Virginia Professor Brian Pusser indicated,
Add to the mix the rise of attention-garnering publicly traded
companies like the University of Phoenix . . . and the partnerships
between universities like Cornell and New York University with
private venture capital funds . . . add some business superstars like . .
. Michael Milken and the pot begins to boil. Add a growing chorus
of protests over the rising costs of higher education, with a pinch of
critiques of the higher education bureaucracy reminiscent of those
leveled earlier at the elementary-secondary system by [school choice
advocates John E.] Chubb and [Terry] Moe, and familiar aromas will
fill the metaphoric kitchen. Stoke the fire with research provided by
groups relatively new to higher education: stock analysts . . . and
there may inevitably be considerably more heat than light shed on
206
the subject.

As Part II-D, infra, highlights, however, a likelihood exists that
marketized HEIs will emanate even less light and greater influence
following the Supreme Court’s contentious 5-4 decision in Citizens
United v. FEC.207
1. Civic Engagement in a Post-Citizens United HEI Market
Even before Citizens United,208 education Professors Brian Pusser
and David Wolcott stated that through the ability to shape regulations
and policies, for-profit HEIs “may ultimately prove to be of the greatest
significance.”209 Marketized HEIs have often attempted to lobby for
initiatives that could hugely benefit them.210 Prior to 2002’s ShaysMeehan Campaign Finance Reform Bill, which banned soft-dollar
political contributions, Apollo directed 68% percent of its soft money to
Republican candidates, and DeVry directed 100% to Republicans.211 In
2003, the University of California system, the largest public education
system in the country, spent more than $1.2 million on political
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

Breneman et al., supra note 17, at 7.
Pusser, supra note 125, at 29.
130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
Id.
Pusser, supra note 125, at 29.
Id.
Pusser & Wolcott, supra note 139, at 181-182.
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lobbying;212 meanwhile, the Apollo Group, Phoenix’s parent
corporation, also found itself among the Top 15 political lobbying
schools, even outspending flagship state schools, such as Big Ten
stalwart Michigan State University (along with its privately financed
law school).213
While 501(c)(3) charitable organizations cannot directly contribute
to candidates with state or federal funds,214 individuals employed at
those organizations can.215 And in the 2004 election cycle, over 90%
percent of funds contributed from employees of the University of
California and Harvard University went to Democrats; the only HEI
employee group to provide more funds to Republicans than the Apollo
Group was the University of Texas, the homestate flagship university of
Republican then-President Bush, who faced re-election that year.216
According to Pusser and Wolcott, “[t]hese data support . . . [that] forprofits have made direct campaign contributions and targeted them at
key legislators.”217
The rise in HEIs’ civic and political engagements mirrors academic
capitalism’s rise over the past fifteen years. For example, in 1980,
twenty-one congressional earmarks existed for HEIs amounting to
approximately $16 million; by 2003, Congress gave HEIs more than
1,900 earmarks, representing an annual expenditure of approximately $2
billion annually.218 But marketized HEIs do not stop their civic
engagement at the legislative branch. To illustrate, in 2001, Phoenix’s
parent company, the Apollo Group, “nominated the former chair of the
House Committee on Education, to the university’s corporate board. In
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 178.
Id.
Id at 178-79. Having said that, more than 60% percent of employee
contributions from each of the Top 15 higher education campaign contributors went to
Democrats.
In the interest of disclosure, my political contributions that year are a matter of
public record; at the time of that election cycle, however, I was not an academic and
instead was employed as an officer within JPMorgan and served as a member of several
publicly held corporations’ boards of directors.
217. Pusser & Wolcott, supra note 139, at 182 (stating that six members of the
House Committee on Education and the Workforce and three members of the Senate
Committee for Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions received funding from Apollo’s
and other for-profits’ Political Action Committees (“PACs”).
218. Id. at 175.
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October 2001, Sally Stroup, then chief Washington lobbyist for the
Apollo Group, was appointed the Assistant Secretary of Education” in
the George W. Bush administration.219
What do marketized HEIs want in return for their civic
engagement? One example stands out in the context of how law schools
finance themselves and generate revenues. In trying to eliminate the
90/10 Rule, marketized HEIs “envision themselves as able to run on
students’ Pell grants alone, especially if students are able to receive
federal aid for low-cost education delivered by adjuncts and taken one
course at a time, on-line.”220 Given the civic engagement
accomplishments of marketized HEIs in a pre-Citizens United
environment, the ability of for-profit HEIs to shape the landscape of
academic capitalism and marketization is unfathomable in a postCitizens United world in which corporations now enjoy First
Amendment rights for purposes of political contributions.221
III. THE PARADE OF REAL AND IMAGINED HORRIBLES
As distinct entities, law schools generally do not: (a) patent ideas or
technological inventions that can generate licensing revenues or equity
stakes; (b) provide skills for which many current employers are willing
to pay tuition;222 or (c) maintain endowments or sufficient donative
sources to cover ongoing operational expenses.223 Moreover, the law
schools unattached to broader universities or enterprises remain
dependent on: (x) generating revenue growth via tuition (or class size)
increases; (y) cutting costs in the largest cost center (faculty
compensation); and (z) the continued existence of Title IV eligibility.224

219. Id. at 173 (internal citations omitted). As an aside, Phoenix’s founder and
Apollo Group’s president, John Sperling, invested approximately $9 million of his
profits from Phoenix/Apollo in Texas A&M and publicly traded company, Genetic
Savings & Clone, to clone his dog, Missy. The Missyplicity project, led by Genetic
Savings & Clone and some members of Texas A&M’s faculty who were equity holders
in the company, produced a cloned cat, but not a dog. Sperling withdrew his funding
from Texas A&M. See SLAUGHTER & RHOADES, supra note 9, at 2-4.
220. SLAUGHTER & RHOADES, supra note 9, at 45.
221. Id.
222. For example, many employers will pay for an MBA; a tiny number of
corporations (and no law firms or governmental entities that I could find) will pay to
groom in-house legal talent.
223. See supra Part II.B.
224. Id.
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On the other hand, as currently constituted, CFLSs attached to
broader enterprises simply do not fit the academically capitalist business
model of other marketized HEIs. If “[l]aw schools tend to be
moneymakers . . . even at poorly rated programs,”225 then even law
schools attached to parent or sibling entities face two undeniable
problems in a marketized HEI system: (i) a desire on the part of the
parent or sibling entities to expand asset stripping from the law school
well beyond the forty-five percent figure;226 and (ii) an almost fiduciary
duty on the part of those governing law schools to maximize the law
schools’ economic value on behalf of the entity’s owners. As a result,
strong internal and external incentives exist to model a law school’s
architecture and business models to reflect the tenure, academic
freedom, faculty governance, and business models to substantially
mirror other marketized HEIs.
A seemingly obvious way for owners to achieve such a goal is to
further asset strip the law school to a level of such economic distress
that its owner places the law school into Chapter 11 bankruptcy
reorganization.227 Once in Chapter 11, Sections 363 and 365 arguably
would permit faculty tenure to be discharged as an executory contract,228
225. Annie Lowery, Law of Averages: Why the law-school bubble is bursting,
SLATE.COM (Mar. 18, 2011 4:49 PM), http://www.slate.com/id/2288751/; see also
Nathan Koppel, Law School Loses Its Allure as Jobs at Firms Seem Scarce, WALL ST. J
(Mar. 17, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487043965045
76204692878631986.html?mod=wsj_share_twitter.
226. See, e.g., supra note 23.
227. 11 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
228. Id. §§ 363(l), 365(b)(1); Jesse M. Fried, Executory Contracts and Performance
Decisions in Bankruptcy, 46 DUKE L.J. 517 (1996); George G. Triantis, The Effects of
Insolvency and Bankruptcy on Contract Performance and Adjustment, 43 U. TORONTO
L.J. 679 (1993). A legitimate question exists as to how a law school’s owners could
benefit from a bankruptcy reorganization, since the pre-bankruptcy reorganization
creditors generally become the post-bankruptcy reorganization owners. The answer is
through the financial engineering of the past decade that developed new financial
instruments (although not necessarily “securities” so as to escape regulation), such as
Credit Default Swaps (“CDSs”).
A CDS is a contract that allows parties to disentangle their ownership interests
from financial interests. This decoupling allows parties to place essentially unregulated
and undisclosed bets on an underlying business entity’s financial collapse. To illustrate,
while SEC filings may list persons as holding a significant ownership percentage of an
entity, those owners may simultaneously possess a CDS betting against the entity,
coupled with a significant creditor position in the business entity. In such a case, a CDS
would bring the CDS holder a more meaningful financial windfall following the
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Credit Default Swaps (“CDSs”) would permit the pre-bankruptcy
owners to maintain post-bankruptcy ownership, and, upon emergence
from bankruptcy, the law school could then hire solely adjunct and term
instructors that mirror the marketized HEI business model that exists in
the competitive landscape.229 Since law schools’ and marketized HEIs’
funding models230 both greatly rely on Title IV funding for financial
support, however, eliminating faculty tenure via a bankruptcy process is
unlikely in the law school setting.231 Specifically, Title IV prohibits
schools that have undergone bankruptcy from receiving Title IV
funding,232 regardless of the bankruptcy code’s typical automatic stay
provisions.233
entity’s financial collapse, rather than success. The creditor stake would also allow the
CDS holder essentially to retain its pre-bankruptcy ownership position post-bankruptcy.
Because CDSs and many creditor positions do not require disclosure to the SEC or even
to a bankruptcy court, owners with specific agendas may engage this process in a
stealth manner. See, e.g., Andrew Scott, CFA, Introduction to Credit Derivatives, J.P.
Morgan Securities, Inc. (Dec. 2005); Kristin N. Johnson, Things Fall Apart: Regulating
the Credit Default Swap Commons, 82 U. COLO. L. REV. 167 (2011); Michael C.
Schouten, The Case for Mandatory Ownership Disclosure, 15 STAN J.L. BUS. & FIN.
127 (2009).
Professors Hu and Westbrook called such creditors “empty creditors” who “are
likely to behave differently from more traditional creditors and raise concerns parallel
to those of empty voters and thus can be usefully considered using a parallel analytical
framework.” Henry T. C. Hu & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Abolition of the Corporate
Duty to Creditors, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1321, 1329-30, 1366, 1382-89, 1395-98, 140103 (2007) (discussing “economic decoupling” between voting and financial interests as
well); see also Patrick D. Fleming, Credit Derivatives Can Create a Financial Incentive
for Creditors to Destroy a Chapter 11 Debtor: Section 1126(e) and Section 105(a)
Provide a Solution, 17 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 189, 189 (2009); Henry T. C. Hu &
Bernard Black, Equity and Debt Decoupling and Empty Voting II: Importance and
Extensions, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 625, 735 (2008).
229. See supra Parts II-III.
230. Id. Having said that, however, some marketized HEI’s have created their own
private loan programs. See, e.g., EDMC 10-K, supra note 3, at 42 (“In August 2008, we
introduced the Education Finance Loan Program, which enables students who have
exhausted all available government sponsored or other aid and have been denied a
private loan to borrow a portion of their tuition and other educational expenses at our
schools not covered by other financial aid sources.”).
231. See, e.g., supra note 227.
232. See 34 C.F.R. § 668.26 (2010).
233. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(16) (2006) (stating generally that while the
commencement of a bankruptcy proceeding operates as a stay that prevents numerous
actions against the debtor entity, agencies defined in Section 435(j) of the HEA or the
Secretary of Education nonetheless may rule a debtor HEI ineligible to receive Title IV
funding).
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A second option to eliminate faculty tenure is financial exigency
outside of the bankruptcy reorganization context.234 Continuing to asset
strip a law school combined with a meaningful short-term reduction in
the number of students in the entering classes could create sufficient
financial exigency to remove tenured faculty members. Such an
argument becomes even more plausible in a continuingly weak domestic
economy in which applications to law schools for the most recent cycle
declined by 11.5% year-over-year.235
Robert Gorman, Emeritus Professor of Law at the University of
Pennsylvania and former chair of both the AALS and AAUP ominously
asserted that
[t]he [law school] deans also contend that tenure increases
institutional costs and inhibits flexibility in staffing and program
design. Operating law schools more cheaply and maximizing
unilateral decanal/administrative control are familiar managerial
objectives. Once again, the ALDA [American Law Dean

234. See AAUP, Termination of Faculty Appointments Because of Financial
Exigency, Discontinuance of a Program or Department, or Medical Reasons, 62 BULL.
AM. ASS’N. U. PROFESSORS 17, 17, 19 (1976) (defining “financial exigency” as “an
imminent financial crisis which threatens the survival of the institution as a whole and
which cannot be alleviated by less drastic means . . . [beyond t]ermination of an
appointment with continuous tenure . . . .”); see also Hahn v. Univ. of District of
Columbia, 789 A.2d 1252 (D.C. 2002); Bd. of Cmty. Coll. Trustees v. Adams, 117 Md.
App. 662 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997); Polishook v. City Univ. of N.Y., 234 A.D.2d 165
(N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1996); Refai v. Cent. Wash. Univ., 49 Wn. App. 1 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1987); Mark L. Adams, supra note 46, at 73-75 (referencing 1940 STATEMENT
OF PRINCIPLES, supra note 60, at 3-4; Walter P. Metzger, Academic Tenure in America:
A Historical Essay, in COMM’N ON ACADEMIC TENURE IN HIGHER EDUC., FACULTY
TENURE 93, 152-53 (1973)) (contextualizing financial exigency and tenure via the
recent faculty dismissals at Tulane University following Hurricane Katrina and stating
that “Tulane . . . will eliminate the majority of doctoral programs and several
undergraduate majors, resulting in 233 faculty members being terminated, sixty-five of
them tenured. Under AAUP guidelines, the university must provide advance notice of
the terminations, discuss the plan with the faculty, and provide adequate severance
pay.”); Robert W. McGee, Academic Tenure: Should It Be Protected By Law?, 20 W.
ST. U. L. REV. 593, 601-02 (stating that without government involvement in tenure, “it
is likely that a number of approaches would emerge. Some schools would continue to
grant the traditional form of tenure; others would abandon it entirely; and some schools
would adopt new combinations and permutations of tenure.”).
235. Lowery, supra note 225.
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236

Association] Board has the industrial model in mind, and not the
academic model, in which academic excellence is the key and
faculty participation in governance is a central element . . . . “[L]egal
education is not primarily achieved by better managers.” I fear that
all too many of the ALDA Board members have as their objective a
law school staffed largely by low-paid part-time and untenured
faculty, who work on one-year or very short-term contracts . . . . The
ALDA letter . . . contends that the scrapping of tenure will allow for
237
“experimentation” and “innovation”

as they relate to faculty retention, compensation, and governance.
Given law schools’ (i) primary method of revenue generation; (ii)
positioning within broader organizations as subject to asset stripping;
(iii) the recognition that the marketized model of HEIs represents
existing economic reality; and (iv) the A.B.A. Committee’s anti-tenure
stance relative to accreditation in a marketized HEI system, Professor
Gorman may not represent the proverbial Chicken Little while the
academic world as law schools have known it, arguably may be coming
to an end.
Legitimate arguments thus suggest that the economic model for
A.B.A.-accredited law schools continues to evolve in material ways for
faculty, students, and other stakeholders. In the face of these potentially
sweeping changes, however, this Article does not attempt to defend the
A.B.A.’s historical cartel powers or to make broadly sweeping
pronouncements that tenure, faculty governance, and academic freedom
rest at the core of an always-correct model for every law school, law
student, and law school stakeholder. I generally tend to believe in
market-based solutions to education.238 For schools beyond those few
whose scholarly output is unquestioned (the so-called “Top-14,” for
instance), operating an outdated model of law school financing in a
marketplace where competitor A.B.A.-accredited law schools engage in

236. This Article presumes that Professor Gorman’s “industrial model” mirrors a
marketized model, and that an “academic model” reflects the idea that because higher
education produces a social good as an externality, HEIs do not fit into a typical
economic market or model.
237. See Letter from Professor Robert A. Gorman, supra note 73 (quoting AALS
President Reese Hansen) (emphasis added).
238. See, e.g., David Groshoff, Unchartered Territory: Market Competition’s
Constitutional Collision with Entrepreneurial Sex-Segregated Charter Schools, 2010
BYU EDUC. & L.J. 307 (2010) (supporting educational innovation and market
development in majority publicly financed K-12 schools and exploring certain
constitutional limits that may set the contours of that market’s development).
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a marketized HEI business model—unconstrained by tenure,239
academic freedom,240 and faculty governance241—likely will create the
financial exigency that could eliminate existing tenure, faculty
governance, and academic freedom, even under the strongest of the
AAUP’s pronouncements.242 As a result, Part IV proposes an
academically capitalist, market-based solution. This proposal asserts that
a Faculty Leveraged Buyout in a marketized HEI landscape can
maintain faculty governance, tenure, and academic freedom, while also
providing economic incentives for junior faculty, alumni, and other law
school stakeholders to capitalistically reshape the post-modern law
school in a manner that can still preserve some of law school’s arguably
most important features, including: (1) longstanding faculty members
with reputations as outstanding scholars and teachers, unafraid to ask the
vexing and politically incorrect questions needed to develop the criticalthinking, analytical, professional, communication, and leadership skills
that the next generation of legal services consumers deserve;243 (2)
students who know that their faculty members are experts in their area
of law in both theory and practice and are not simply practitioners
thrown into a classroom to tell a semester’s worth of “war stories;”244 (3)
alumni whose ties to the school go back as far as their experience as a
student with that still existing faculty base; while embracing a
marketized economic landscape that demands more from law faculty.245
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

See supra text accompanying notes 46-47.
See, e.g., supra note 52 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., supra note 64 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., supra notes 27, 58-61 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Amy B. Cohen, The Dangers of the Ivory Tower: The Obligation of
Law Professors to Engage in the Practice of Law, 50 LOY. L. REV. 623, 627-28 n.14
(2004).
244. See, e.g., Patrick J. Schiltz, Legal Ethics in Decline: The Elite Law Firm, the
Elite Law School, and the Moral Formation of the Novice Attorney, 82 MINN. L. REV.
705, 781-82 (1998) (stating that “[m]any in the academy scorn ‘war stories,’ and for
good reason. Used improperly, they can waste time and take the place of hard thinking
by both professor and student. By the same token, war stories, when used carefully, can
be marvelous teaching tools.”).
245. See, e.g., Jason M. Dolin, Opportunity Lost: How Law School Disappoints Law
Students, the Public, and the Legal Profession, 44 CAL. W. L. REV. 219, 248 (asserting
that “[h]aving neither a solid grounding in educational theory nor in law practice, the
professorate has little experience in either. The average law school professor was
trained as neither an educator nor as an experienced practitioner. They were hired to
teach primarily because they were outstanding law students. Despite all of their other
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IV. EMBRACING ACADEMIC CAPITALISM THROUGH
A FACULTY LEVERAGED BUYOUT
I think of all the education that I missed.
But then my homework was never quite like this . . .
I heard about your lessons, but lessons are so cold.
246
I didn’t know about this school.

In 2004, University of Arizona education Professors Sheila
Slaughter and (former AAUP General Secretary) Gary Rhoades stated,
Those colleges and universities unable or unwilling to integrate with
the new economy have difficulty accessing new programs and
opportunities. Similarly, programs, departments, or colleges that
resist, ignore, or are unable to intersect the new economy within
institutions that are generally pursuing an academic capitalist
knowledge/learning regime rarely share in its rewards and
247
incentives.

In 2008, Ohio State English Professor Frank Donoghue asserted
that
Any meaningful debate about tenure has to start with the fact that it
is slowly but surely disappearing, and the current workforce in
higher education is unwittingly hastening its extinction . . . . The
extreme polemics of this debate . . . are . . . irrelevant to the

attributes, in general they know little of practice, receive insufficient feedback as to
whether their training is effective, and do not have sufficient personal knowledge in
either education or law practice to draw upon in their teaching. It is hard to imagine a
less rational system to train new attorneys.”); see also David L. Gregory, The Assault
on Scholarship, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 993, 1001-1003 (1991) (claiming that “[t]rue
excellence in teaching and scholarship is rarely achieved, but it is the integrated goal to
which every committed law professor should aspire . . . . In the law school, a
professional school, scholarship takes much of its meaning from, and should in turn
energize, the applied context of classroom teaching dynamics . . . . Scholarship without
teaching tends to be abstract and highly egocentric; teaching without scholarship tends
to be pedantic and superficial. One cannot be fully real without the other. The
professional law school must be grounded in both theory and praxis, in both scholarship
and teaching.”).
246. VAN HALEN, HOT FOR TEACHER (Warner Bros. 1984).
247. SLAUGHTER & RHOADES, supra note 9, at 22.
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demographic realities and the firsthand accounts of the changing
248
nature of work in higher education.

And in late July 2011, Harvard Business School Professors Clayton
M. Christensen and Henry J. Eyring claimed that
Private universities without national recognition and large
endowments are at great financial risk. So are public universities,
even prestigious ones such as the University of California at
Berkeley. . . . With the advent of high-quality online learning, there
are new less expensive institutional alternatives to traditional
universities, their standing enhanced by changes in accreditation
standards that play to their strengths in demonstrating student
learning outcomes . . . . For the vast majority of universities change
is inevitable . . . . Ideally, the faculty members, administrators, and
alumni who best appreciate the totality of the university’s
contributions to society will, in the spirit of self-regulation, play a
leading role in revitalizing their beloved institutions. They have the
249
capacity to determine their own fate . . . .

As a result, schools and faculty members face tremendously
increasing market forces regarding tenure, faculty governance, and
academic freedom in a rapidly changing landscape. In the face of these
changes, this Part seeks to educate and integrate law school faculty
members with the marketized HEI economy directly. Specifically, this
Part demonstrates how faculty at CFLSs can opportunistically embrace
and exploit academic capitalism to maintain three of the most important,
oft-criticized, and currently threatened hallmarks of legal academia:250
248.

FRANK DONOGHUE, THE LAST PROFESSORS: THE CORPORATE UNIVERSITY AND
FATE OF THE HUMANITIES, 55 (Fordham Univ. Press, 3d ed. 2008). See Ellen
Gibson, Highest-Paid University Presidents, BLOOMBERG BUS. WK. (last visited July
28, 2011), http://images.businessweek.com/ss/09/02/0216_college_pres/2.htm; see also
Scott Jaschik, Gordon Gee’s Call for “Reinvention” of Higher Ed., INSIDE g the 200708 highest paid public university president, Ohio State’s E. Gordon Gee, as stating that
HEI’s face a choice: “reinvention or extinction”); cf. supra text accompanying notes
177-178 (describing CEO-like compensation HIGHER ED. (Feb. 9, 2009),
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2009/02/09/gee (quotinor marketized HEI
presidents).
249. Clayton M. Christenson & Henry J. Eyring, How Disruptive Innovation is
Remaking the University, HARVARD BUS. SCH. (July 25, 2011), http://hbswk.hbs.edu/
item/6746.html?wknews=07272011 (excerpted from CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN &
HENRY J. EYRING, THE INNOVATIVE UNIVERSITY (John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 2011)).
250. See supra Part III.
THE
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(1) tenure, (2) academic freedom, and (3) faculty governance.251 This
Part relies on millennia-old strategies still employed by modern business
leaders to educate non-business law faculty and stakeholders on the
relevant components of modern finance and competitiveness strategy to
deploy a tactical strategy that would wrest control away from owners
who see tenure and faculty governance as obstacles to an effective
business model, in an environment in which law schools’ governing
cartel has staked an anti-tenure position. Noted Harvard Business School
Professor and competitiveness expert Michael Porter
[Q]uoted from Sun Tzu[‘s The Art of War] when he lectured the
National Football League owners on [competitiveness] . . . . Venture
capitalist Asher Edelman made The Art of War required reading for
admission to his course on entrepreneuring at Columbia
252
University. Quantity orders for The Art of War have been placed
by business organizations . . . . the very simplicity of The Art of War
makes Sun Tzu’s lessons readily transferable to business strategy.
The ancient principles of Sun Tzu establish a firm foundation for
understanding the strategic rules of business in the new
253
millennium.

Articulating each of Sun Tzu’s business lessons is beyond this
Article’s scope, but the general ideas behind them, such as laying plans,
understanding the challenge, marshalling resources, strategically varying
one’s tactics, and intelligently understanding an opponent’s strengths,
weaknesses, opportunities, and threats, all underpin this Part’s businesscentered strategic proposal.
A. EDUCATING PARTICIPANTS ABOUT THE KEY TERMS
Following a July 2011 New York Times article excoriating him,
New York Law School’s Dean Richard A. Matasar responded, “The
Times article suggests that it is impossible to reform legal education
from within. That is simply untrue . . . I have always said that our first
responsibility is to control those things we can control—the quality of

251.
252.

See, e.g., supra note 64.
The text also constituted required reading as part of the MBA program from
which I graduated.
253. GERALD A. MICHAELSON AND STEVEN MICHAELSON, SUN TZU: THE ART OF
WAR FOR MANAGERS: 50 STRATEGIC RULES UPDATED FOR TODAY’S BUSINESS xviii-xix
(Adams Media 2nd ed. 2010) (emphasis added).
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what we give our students.”254 This Part argues that the legal academy
indeed can reform legal education from within by availing itself of the
resources it can garner and control.
The first resource that the legal academy must garner is an
understanding of the economics of marketized higher education. Most
law professors teach in non-business areas and, perhaps, are unfamiliar
with the rapid changes in the business model and competitive landscape
of law schools.255 In fact, “despite the implications of applying market
logic to colleges and universities, many, even most [academics], are not
particularly successful capitalists.”256 This failure has occurred despite
other scholars having identified law (along with medicine and business)
as a “prime example” of a professional program with a “strong market
position[]”257 Meanwhile, the individuals leading marketized universities
are those who understand the realities of academic capitalism.258 This
Part helps explain these specialized transactions so that faculties may
add such knowledge to the resources they control.
Second, the legal academy must recognize that to maintain faculty
governance and tenure within marketized legal education, faculties must
streamline their decision-making process. For example, the
organizational characteristics of many HEIs permit for poor, “garbage
can” decision-making.259 Such architecture prevents rapid decisionmaking and pivoting necessary to compete in the current marketplace.
Third, despite researching and citing a large body of scholarly work
on the economics of law school and the financing of HEIs to write this
Article, none of the texts encountered mentioned the acronymical term
“EBITDA.”260 To varying degrees, these texts, often written by
economists and educational or legal theorists, mentioned the typical
254. Richard A. Matasar, Law School Cost, Educational Outcomes, and a
Reformer’s Agenda, NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL (last visited July 28, 2011),
http://www.nyls.edu/news_and_events/matasars_response_to_nytimes/.
255. See THE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS 2010-2011, DIRECTORY OF
LAW TEACHERS (West/Association of American Law Schools 2010-2011).
256. SLAUGHTER & RHOADES, supra note 9, at 308.
257. ZEMSKY ET AL., supra note 23, at 55.
258. See supra notes 92, 95-98, 100-104, 106-107, 111-112 and accompanying text.
259. See Stanley O. Ikenberry, Privatizing the Public Research University, in
PRIVATIZING THE PUBLIC UNIVERSITY: PERSPECTIVES FROM ACROSS THE ACADEMY 9596 (Christopher C. Morphew & Peter D. Eckel eds., Johns Hopkins Univ. Press. 2009)
(internal citations omitted).
260. See infra text accompanying notes 267, 269-274 for a detailed definition and
contextualization of EBITDA.
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litany of elementary financial terms, including “revenues,” “expenses,”
“costs,” “margins,” and—an amorphous term that lacks meaningful nonaccounting financial definition, “profits.”
The key to understanding the financing of marketized HEIs and this
Article’s proposed solution lies with understanding both EBITDA and
market multiples. Despite EBITDA’s heavy use by courts and
professional investment analysts, EBITDA’s importance apparently was
lost upon the many scholars cited in, and researched for, this Article
regarding modern educational finance.261 But
in practice investment bankers estimate the value of a seller by
comparing it with other recently sold [entities] that are similar in
asset size. The sales price of the similar [entity] is divided by its
earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization
(EBITDA) to obtain the market value as a multiple of EBITDA. This
262
ratio is then multiplied by the EBITDA of the seller.”

Moreover, “courts have taken to measuring a company’s earnings
by its earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization
(EBITDA).”263 Further underscoring EBITDA’s ostensibly obvious
importance to marketized HEI financing is the placement of EBITDA’s
role in HEI within the first several pages of the most recently available
annual report filed with the SEC of Western State’s parent entity.264 In
pertinent part, the EDMC 10-K states, “EBITDA . . . [is] used by
261. See, e.g., THEODORE M. BARNHILL, JR. ET AL., HIGH-YIELD BONDS: MARKET
STRUCTURE, PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT, AND CREDIT RISK MODELING 10 (McGraw Hill
1999); MOYER, DISTRESSED DEBT ANALYSIS: STRATEGIES FOR SPECULATIVE INVESTORS
96, supra note 3, at 96 (J. Ross Pub., 2005) (“[M]ost people involved in finance on a
daily basis simply accept EBITDA as a reasonable measure of cash flow.”); see also
infra text accompanying note 263 (describing courts’ reliance on EBITDA).
262. Paul Gertler & Jennifer Kuan, Does It Matter Who Your Buyer Is? The Role of
Nonprofit Mission in the Market for Corporate Control of Hospitals, 52 J.L. & ECON.
295, 298 n.5 (2009).
263. Robert T. Miller, Canceling the Deal: Two Models of Material Adverse
Change Clauses in Business Combination Agreements, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 99, 100
(2009). In his piece, Miller describes various EBITDA multiple valuation
methodologies. Id. at 103, 191-92. But see John Mills et al., Defining Free Cash Flow,
CPA J. (Jan. 2002), http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajournal/2002/0102/features/f013
602.htm (describing some deficiencies with EBITDA, defining “free cash flow”
(“FCF”), which accounts for changes in working capital and capital expenditures, and
articulating some problems inherent in FCF. Regardless, EBITDA is the typical
industry standard, and this Article, therefore, stresses EBITDA’s current relevance, not
its perfection).
264. EDMC 10-K, supra note 3.
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management to measure operating performance [and m]anagement
believes that EBITDA is helpful . . . because EBITDA excludes the
results of decisions that are outside the control of operating
management.”265 One might think, with all of the scholarly discussion
regarding HEI markets, that someone would have been concerned with
intrinsic, rather than theoretical, economic value, regardless of the HEI
market’s inefficiencies or illiquidity. But the absence of a discussion of
EBITDA relative to economic discussions of education financing,
underscores either the paucity or quality of research regarding
education.266
Since the reader now recognizes the importance of EBITDA and
market multiples, s/he must also recognize that no sexy or exciting way
exists to describe the entity valuation process that will leave one in an
awakened state, particularly in a law, rather than a finance, journal. At
its essence, however, EBITDA simply represents an acronym for
“Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation, and Amortization.”267
EBITDA thus serves as a proxy for cash flows uncommitted elsewhere
within an enterprise, exemplifying its importance to debt and equity
stakeholders in the (HEI) marketplace. Neither revenues nor net incomes
nor costs nor assets determine an entity’s value. Instead, “intrinsic value
is based on an enterprise’s “ability to generate cash flow in the future,”
265.
266.

Id. at 56-58.
Compare Jason L. Riley, Was the $5 Billion Worth It?, WALL ST. J., July 23,
2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111903554904576461571362
279948.html (stating that “[c]ompared with R&D spending in the pharmaceutical or
information-technology sectors, [Bill Gates] says, next to nothing is spent on education
research. ‘That’s partly because of the problem of who would do it. Who thinks of it as
their business?’”), with Andrew J. Coulson, People Think of Something as Their
Business When It Is Their Business, CATO INST., July 25, 2011, http://www.cato-atliberty.org/people-think-of-something-as-their-business-when-it-is-their-business/
(asserting “a vast army of academics has been cranking out research in this field for
generations . . . . [T]he problem is not a lack of research, but rather that most of the
research is useless and that the rare exceptions have been ignored . . . . [b]ecause, as
Bill Gates correctly observes, hardly anyone thinks of education as their business. And
how do you get masses of brilliant entrepreneurs to think of education as their business?
You make it easy for them to make it their business. When and where education is
allowed to participate in the free enterprise system, entrepreneurs enter that field just as
they do any other–and excellence is identified and scales up. It is a process that happens
automatically due to the freedoms and incentives inherent in that system.”)
267. EBITDA “is defined as net income (loss) plus interest (income) expense, net,
loss on early retirement of debt, provision for (benefit from) income taxes and
depreciation and amortization.” EDMC 10-K, supra note 3, at 57.
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then discounted by the entity’s expected future cash flows (generally
represented by EBITDA) by an appropriate discount rate.268
Just as many of their students have debt on their personal balance
sheets, numerous law schools leverage their institutional balance sheets
by issuing significant amounts of debt.269 As a result, understanding and
identifying the cash flows that a school’s operations generate and that
remain uncommitted elsewhere, represent key drivers of the school’s
current value, as well as the financial future of an HEI in a marketized
HEI economy. Other benefits of EBITDA include its elimination of
accounting gimmickry required under Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles (“GAAP”)—such as depreciation and amortization—that
have no bearing on cash currently moving through an entity, as well as
EBITDA’s ability to eliminate disparate tax treatments among entities
that arise due to entity type or jurisdictional locations. Therefore,
generally speaking, EBITDA combined with market multiples of other
HEIs represents a convenient way to compare cash flows among
entities, regardless of the enterprises’ varying tax treatments,270 capital
structures, or previous capital expenditures.271 Lastly, EBITDA
multiples represent a material variable in entity restructurings and
reorganizations, including leveraged buyouts (“LBOs”), which lie at the
heart of this Article’s proposed solution.272

268.
269.

KOLLER ET AL., supra note 2, at 52.
New York Law School, for example, floated $135 million in debt securities in
2006 and, according to its dean, is currently “one of only a handful of schools of our
size and structure with an A rating.” Matasar, supra note 254; Segal, supra note 23.
Moreover, analysts at high yield or “junk” bond desks follow bonds of Western State’s
parent company, which means that their bonds maintain a below investment grade
rating. E-mail from Wall Street firm (on file with author); EDWARD I. ALTMAN & SCOTT
A. NAMMACHER, INVESTING IN JUNK BONDS: INSIDE THE HIGH YIELD DEBT MARKET 4
(John Wiley & Sons 1987) (= “[T]he term junk originated in the mid-1970s to describe
those corporate securities that lost their investment grade status due to a fundamental
deterioration in the quality of their operating and financial performance.”).
270. Eliminating the variability of tax treatments is particularly important when
comparing HEIs, as non-profit, public institutions generally have no tax liability and
also have no need for the corporate tax shield that accompanies the debt issuances of
for-profit HEIs.
271. See, e.g., ASWATH DAMODARAN, INVESTMENT VALUATION: TOOLS AND
TECHNIQUES FOR DETERMINING THE VALUE OF ANY ASSET 691 (John Wiley & Sons, 2d
ed. 2002) and accompanying Figure 25.1 (describing an asset purchase as an
“acquisition”).
272. See, e.g., STUART C. GILSON, Technical Note: Valuing Companies in Corporate
Restructurings, in GILSON, supra note 169, at 498; Richard Ruback, RJR, NABISCO
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B. THE TACTICAL MECHANICS OF AN LBO AND A PROPOSED FLBO
In a vanilla LBO, new ownership acquires a company, entity,
subsidiary, or operating division “in a transaction funded by debt
[leverage] supported by the earnings of the firm itself.”273 In other
words, the new owners do not need to fund the equity capital personally
to purchase the target entity. In the context of a proposed Faculty
Leveraged Buyout (“FLBO”), this consideration is crucial. Law
faculty—while comfortably compensated but not rich as a group—likely
could not independently deploy millions of dollars to own a law school.
While the post-LBO entity sometimes must sell assets to cover interest
payments associated with the increased debt-load, an attractive feature
of a FLBO versus a LBO is that the FLBO halts asset stripping from the
law school to other parts of a larger entity. Keeping these assets and
revenues entirely within the FLBO’s law school strengthens, rather than
weakens, the law school’s ability to service the debt-load associated
with the FLBO.
The FLBO process would begin with a law school’s faculty
agreeing to retain an investment bank.274 Some investment banks already
maintain meaningful equity positions in an existing HEI with a wholly

HARV. BUS. SCH. CASE NO. 9-289-056, at 1-12 (Aug. 29, 2006); see also DAMODARAN,
supra note 271, at 691 (discussing the famous RJR Nabisco LBO).
273. ALTMAN & NAMMACHER, supra note 269, at 171; see also KOLLER ET AL.,
supra note 2, at 15-16.
274. See also DAMODARAN, supra note 271, at 693-724 (discussing the many steps
in an acquisition, including, inter alia, acquiring undervalued firms [this seems to be the
case in fragmented industries, such as the HEI industry]; skill in execution; potential tax
benefits [whether via Net Operating Loss Carryback/Carryforwards will exist, writing
up asset values post-takeover, the interest tax shield that will likely ensure following an
issuance of LBO debt, etc.]; changes in management practices [faculty governance];
target entity [law school] valuation generally based on determining five years’ worth of
projected cash flows, adding a terminal year firm value, and discounting all future cash
flows to the present by some cost of capital, often, although not always correctly, a
weighted cost of capital (“WACC”) [When it comes to such valuations, as Sir Mix-ALot may have said, “Baby Got WACC”], selecting the appropriate comparable firms
and multiples, and structuring the acquisition, and setting the appropriate exchange ratio
and accounting considerations [e.g., purchase versus pooling]); see also EDMC 10-K,
supra note 3, at 7 (stating that “the post-secondary education industry is highly
fragmented . . . .”).
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owned law school subsidiary,275 which a law faculty may not appreciate,
given a potential conflict of interest. In short, the investment bank’s role
would be to (a) determine an appropriate amount of debt that the faculty
could raise;276 (b) ascertain the appropriate interest rate that the
marketplace would demand for that debt;277 (c) find investors willing to
invest in that debt; and (d) complete the transaction in which the funds
flow from the investors to the now-faculty-controlled law school entity
purchased at an agreed upon price from existing owners, with the law
school making scheduled interest payments to the investors (or assigns)
secured by the investment bank.278
The most immediate benefit of an FLBO would be a return to
complete faculty governance. The second benefit would be the faculty’s
ability to ensure that it controls the tenure process, not a larger,
marketized HEI in which tenure is anathema to the marketized HEI’s
business model. But beyond the assurance of faculty governance and
tenure, an FLBO potentially provides law schools with additional
flexibility to incentivize a variety of stakeholders, including tenured
faculty, junior faculty, students, and alumni. For example, just as
partners at law firms receive partner draws upon a successful year, the
tenured faculty—assuming the FLBO debt is reduced to reasonable
levels as articulated in the FLBO indenture—could declare meaningful
dividends. Tenure-track faculty would have not only the incentive of
earning tenure, but also the additional financial rewards that could come
from having an ownership stake in the school. Assuming that the faculty
held Series B shares (with transfer restrictions articulated in the charter
to ensure that non-faculty could not become owners, at least without a
first refusal right), then alumni of the school who passed the bar or who
achieved career or community success could receive Series A shares.279
275. See EDMC 10-K, supra note 3, at 49. Having said that, Providence Equity
Partners, Goldman Sachs, and Leeds Equity Partners may “acquire and hold interests in
businesses that compete directly or indirectly” with that company. Id.
276. Phoenix founder John Sperling indicated that once an educational institution is
built, “‘then you go out to the capital markets and they shower money on you like it’s
going out of style.’” BERG, supra note 91, at 122-23.
277. For example, EDMC’s current debt outstanding reflects rates between 8.75%
and 10.25%. EDMC 10-K, supra note 3, at 99.
278. In most buyout situations, the target entity—here the law school—continues to
exist but does so privately, often via a tender offer. See, e.g., DAMODARAN, supra note
271, at 691 and accompanying Fig. 25.1.
279. Shared ownership of an HEI’s assets has existed for generations. See, e.g.,
Mark D. Bauer, Small Liberal Arts Colleges, Fraternities, and Antitrust: Rethinking
Hamilton College, 53 CATH. U. L. REV. 347, 387-400 (2004) (indicating that fraternities
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All of these steps arguably strengthen the alignment of interests between
a law school and its constituent stakeholders.
C. SO, WHAT’S A FACULTY TO PAY TO FLBO ITS LAW SCHOOL?
As recently as July 2011, a former A.B.A.-accredited law school
dean—when describing an A.B.A.-accredited law school’s revenues and
expenses—described the A.B.A. and the law school process as a case of
“regulatory capture.”280 Other critics have described the A.B.A. as a
cartel.281 And given that background, it should come as no surprise that
the A.B.A. rejected my attempt to obtain law schools’ financial
information.282 Nonetheless, some digging through various databases
turned up several law schools’ recent audited financial statements,
including several schools who were involved in public M&A
discussions.283
Auditors of public company financial statements typically conduct
their audits in accordance with the standards of the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board (“PCAOB”).284 Conversely, auditors of
owned campus housing and land at schools such as Williams College (from 18331962); Bowdoin College (from 1841-1997); Bucknell University (from 1887-Present);
Amherst College (1836-1984); and Denison University (1800s-1995)).
280. David Van Zandt, The Case Against Law School: Should the Standard Three
Years of Law School, Followed by the Bar Exam, Be the Only Path to a Legal Career?
N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 2011 11:40AM), http://www.nytimes.com/Roomfordebate
/2011/07/21/the-case-against-law-school/reduce-credit-requirements-for-law-school.
Van Zandt is President of the New School and former Dean of Northwestern University
Law School. Id.
281. See, e.g., supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
282. E-mail from Kenneth R. Williams, supra note 204.
283. Audited financial statements on file with author.
284. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 404, 116 Stat. 745,
789 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2006), which Congress enacted after the Enron and
WorldCom accounting scandals, created the PCAOB. The PCAOB’s first chairperson,
William Webster, had to resign his position as PCAOB’s head quickly after
appointment, due to his service as chair of the audit committee of the board of directors
of U.S. Technologies, which (i) had been under investigation for … wait … yes …
accounting irregularities and (ii) had, with Webster’s blessing, recently fired U.S.
Technologies’ initial auditors who had brought material deficiencies to the audit
committee’s attention! See, e.g., ZABIHOLLAH REZAEE & RICHARD RILEY, FINANCIAL
STATEMENT FRAUD: PREVENTION AND DETECTION 159 (John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 2d ed.
2009) (stating also that “because SOX and the PCAOB were created to improve the
accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures, William Webster and then-SEC

2012]

FACULTY LEVERAGED BUYOUTS

445

non-profit entities often employ Government Accounting Standards
issued by the United States Comptroller General.285 While auditors of
public companies essentially present uniform financial statement
formats, the auditors’ presentation of the information contained in nonprofit audits can vary significantly.286 As a result, a complete
understanding of these financials is impossible without speaking to a
member of the auditing team, which I did not do as part of my research
for this Article. Nonetheless, the two private, “non-profit” law schools
and one public state-run law school that I reviewed seemed typical of
reviewing small, private entities in a still segmented industry.287 Net
losses existed at two of the schools, with back-of-the-envelope
EBITDAs varying from between approximately $1.25 million and $9
million.288
A number of for-profit education providers exist that trade publicly
on national exchanges, including my law school’s parent company.
Sampling six of them yielded an average trailing twelve month (“TTM”)
EBITDA figure of $677.65 million, although the Education Industry’s
Average TTM EBITDA, per finance.yahoo.com, stood significantly
below that figure at $19.52 million. Regardless, the average EBITDAto-Enterprise Value multiple for the six entities that I sampled ranged
between 2.26x and 7.20x, with an average of 4.57x, a median of 4.04x,
and a standard deviation of 1.95. As a result, the public company
comparables suggest that a law faculty could reasonably expect to pay
between 4.0-5.0x the TTM EBITDA.
But before student, faculty, and other stakeholder readers go
rushing out the door (anything to stop talking about EBITDA and
quantitative analysis in a law review article!) to FLBO their law schools,
and before any discussion of investment banking fees occurs,289 a
chairman Harvey Pitt came under considerable fire. Pitt resigned from the SEC and
Webster stepped down about a week later.”).
285. See REZAEE & RILEY, supra note 284.
286. Id.
287. In a highly segmentized market, however, the predictability of returns and
valuation becomes more difficult. See, e.g., Lior Menzly & Oguzhan Ozbas, Market
Segmentation and Cross-Predictability of Returns, J. FIN. (forthcoming), available at
http://www.afajof.org/journal/forth_abstract.asp?ref=596.
288. See supra note 283.
289. This Article includes no such discussion, as readers likely know that I-Bankers
are paid quite well. See, e.g., Paul Oyer, The Making of an Investment Banker: Stock
Market Shocks, Career Choice, and Lifetime Income, 63 J. FIN. 2601, 2624 (2008)
(stating, inter alia, that member professions that typically employ individuals with
business-focused graduate degrees “earn an average of $286K 15 years after
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number of meaningful arguments exist that a 4.0-5.0x
EBITDA/Enterprise Value multiple overvalues the intrinsic value of the
school and requires meaningful discounting.
Beyond the typical liquidity, marketability, and ownership
concentration discounts that basic corporate finance and valuation books
discuss290 that would adjust the intrinsic value of the law school
downward, this Article—supra Part II291—highlighted the similarities
inherent in the developing marketization of CFLSs and higher education
today, as well as the U.S. hybridly financed health care industry in the
1980s.292 For example, UC Berkeley Business School Professor Paul
Gertler and Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research Visiting
Scholar Jennifer Kuan predicted that “a nonprofit seller will charge a
lower price to a buyer with better aligned incentives. The predicted price
differential suggests a dual-price equilibrium based not on market
failure or temporary information asymmetry but rather on different
organizational forms.”293 In other words, the active takeover market for
hospitals during their marketization demonstrated that the organizational
architectures of the buyer and the seller helped drive the transaction’s
ultimate purchase price. According to Gertler and Kuan,
[N]onprofits behave differently in the competitive market for
corporate control. When dealing with for-profits, nonprofits behave
like for-profits, buying and selling at the same prices. But when
dealing with nonprofits, they behave markedly differently, selling at
a substantial discount to like-minded nonprofits. Religious hospitals
discount only to other religious hospitals, while less restrictive
nonreligious nonprofits discount to all nonprofits. Given the
religious alignment of these results, we interpret the nonprofit
mission as playing a deciding role in price discrimination. That said,
the mission need not be religious; in the anecdote cited, a
nonreligious nonprofit sold to another nonreligious nonprofit at a

graduation, while someone who starts as an investment banker can expect to earn $1.2
million at that point,” representing “almost double the $645K earned by management
consultants” at the same time after graduation).
290. See, e.g., JOHN J. STOCKDALE, BVR’S GUIDE TO DISCOUNTS FOR LACK OF
MARKETABILITY (2011 ed., Bus. Valuation Res. 2011).
291. See supra note 119.
292. Gertler & Kuan, supra note 262 passim.
293. Gertler & Kuan, supra note 262, at 296.
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discount, while the losing for-profit bidder, Columbia/ HCA, was
294
later convicted of Medicare fraud.

Therefore, not only should those individuals prepared to engage in
a marketized HEI FLBO of a CLFS understand traditional valuation
methodologies, those potential acquirers should also be aware that the
organizational architecture of their acquisition target may result in
meaningful discounts from what otherwise might appear to be the law
school’s intrinsic value. Moreover, despite marketized HEIs’ insistence
that faculty cannot and should not govern, because managers manage
best, faculty members should be aware that recent studies suggest that in
the context of corporate takeovers, groups, not individuals, submitted
financially sounder acquisition bids, in large part due to the
collaborative learning that occurs through the process inherent in shared
governance.295 As a result, those groups materially decreased their risk
of falling prey to the economic winner’s curse phenomenon.296
CONCLUSION
This Article underscored the unique opportunity that HEIs in the
U.S. possess to provide opportunities for a broad base of professionally
minded students. Attempting to bring more cultural relevancy into the
legal profession, I accepted my current position at a marketized school
of opportunity that educates one of the most diverse student bodies of
any A.B.A.-accredited law schools in the country. Given recent M&A
activity among law schools, including privatization and spinoffs,
combined with decanal attempts to remove faculty tenure, this Article
cautions students, faculty members, and stakeholders at traditional law
schools not to stand idly by and allow legal education to reshape itself
under a marketized HEI business model that explicitly rejects academic
294. Id. at 304-05 (finding also that while non-profits and for-profits appeared to
pay the same acquisition consideration for for-profit targets, non-profits received
statistically significant—when the coefficients on for-profit buyers were restricted to
zero—forty-three percent discounts when purchasing a non-profit and twenty-nine
percent discounts when purchasing government-owned hospitals). Id. at 300-01.
295. Marco Casariet al., When Do Groups Perform Better than Individuals? A
Company Takeover Experiment (June 22, 2011) (Quaderni DSE Working Paper No.
763, 2011) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1873267.
296. See, e.g., RICHARD H. THALER, THE WINNER’S CURSE: PARADOXES AND
ANOMALIES OF ECONOMIC LIFE 50-52 (FREE PRESS 1992) (explaining a “winner’s curse”
as the difference between true value and the value overpaid to secure the asset during an
auction or bidding process).

448

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XVII

freedom, tenure, and faculty governance. No doubt, many problems
beyond the scope of this Article must occur to reshape legal education in
a learner-driven and mission centered manner; but professing law—
controversial at its core—requires the security of academic freedom,
tenure, and faculty governance.
To preserve these most important hallmarks of a meaningful legal
education, as law professors, students, and stakeholders continue to
witness mergers, spinoffs, splitoffs, tenure removal, and institutional
privatization, this Article argues that faculty at law schools that either
are currently—or are faced with becoming—CFLSs should strongly
consider embracing academic capitalism and marketization for the
purpose of undergoing a FLBO. Doing so demonstrates a commitment
to join the competitive economic landscape while ensuring that the most
important hallmarks of legal academia continue to exist for the next
generation of consumers and lawyers-in-training.

